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Two decades after the end of central planning, we investigate the extent to which the advantages
bequeathed by planning in terms of high investment in physical infrastructure and human capital
compensated for the costs in allocative inefficiency and weak incentives for innovation. We
assemble and analyse three separate types of evidence. First, we find that countries that were
initially relatively poor prior to planning benefitedmore, asmeasured by long-run GDP per capita
levels, from infrastructure and human capital than they suffered fromweakmarket incentives. For
initially relatively rich countries the opposite is true. Second, using various measures of physical
stocks of infrastructure and human capital we show that at the end of planning, formerly planned
countries had substantially different endowments from their contemporaneousmarket economy
counterparts. However, these differences were much more important for poor than for rich
countries. Finally, we use firm-level data to measure the cost of a wide range of constraints on
firm performance, and we show that after more than a decade of transition in 2002–05, poor
ex-planned economies differ muchmore from their market counterparts, in respect to both good
and bad aspects of the planning legacy, than do relatively rich ones. However, the persistent
beneficial legacy effects disappeared under the pressure of strong growth in the formerly planned
economies in the run-up to the global financial crisis.
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1. Introduction
“Communism is government by the Soviets plus the electrification of the whole land.... Only when the economy has been
electrified and modern heavy industry has become the technical basis of industry, agriculture and transportation, only then
will we succeed at last.”(V.I. Lenin, 1920)
This paper examines the effects of exposure to Soviet-style planning on long-r un economic development.We use two benchmarks
to view the outcome of the large-scale planning experiment in the 20th century. In the first, we compare countries that were similar
before planning was imposed. How did the countries exposed to planning fare in terms of long-run development as compared with
countries that were at similar levels of development when planning began? In the second comparison, we take countries at similar
levels of GDP per capita when planning ended and ask whether planning left countries different from their peers in ways that were
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likely to be important for their future development. The first perspective sheds light on the overall development trajectory due to
planning and the second on particular qualitative features bequeathed to the countries that underwent the experience of planning.
Hypotheses about the impact of planning on development have a long history. Restricting attention to Soviet-style planning, they
run from the lengthy debate in the 1930s on the merits of planning versus the market, through the evidence that accumulated in the
sub-field of comparative economics in the post-war years to more recent evidence on the role of institutions such as competitive
markets in fostering growth. We focus on two of the core ideas that emerge from these literatures. The first is that planning is
detrimental to long-run economic growth, partly because of a wide range of static allocative inefficiencies, and partly because
planning inhibits the adoption of higher productivity technologies and prevents the closure of low productivity enterprises and
activities. Interference with the Schumpeterian processes of creative destruction weakens productivity growth by switching off both
the incentive for enterprises to move a step ahead of the competition and the threat of bankruptcy. Market institutions external to
firms, such as the rule of law, the control of corruption, a stablemacroeconomic environment and the efficient administration of taxes,
licenses and customs have also been identified as important in enabling the benefits of “the market” to be reaped.
The second thesis linking planning to development is that a symptom of the interference by planners in market processes was the
priority given by them to investment in physical infrastructure and education. Adopting planning early in the process of industrialisation
could generate rapid development and growth, and is the standard explanation for why the USSR grew rapidly in the 40 years after the
adoption of the Stalinist planning system in 1928. Even inmature, industrialised economies, planning could be growth-promoting to the
extent thatmarket failures in capitalist market economies can prevent the adequate supply of public infrastructure and education. Since
Soviet planning overrode some of the weaknesses of market systems as well as some of their strengths, an overall evaluation of the
legacy of planning is likely to be complex, involving a trade-off between these two types of effect. The fact that the ideological fervour
withwhich these questionswere once debated has been diminishing as the Soviet Union recedes into historymeans that it is becoming
easier than it used to be to approach the overall evaluation in a comparatively dispassionate frame of mind.
Recent historical research has already shed important light on the impact of planning on the growth of the countries that
experienced it. Good andMa (1999) construct a consistent series of per capita GDP from 1870 to 1989 for the present day states of
Central and Eastern Europe. They use this to compare the performance of the countries in this region with those of the rest of
Europe. Their overall conclusion is that there is “no systematic difference in growth rates between Central and Eastern Europe and
the rest of Europe” (p. 114). One qualification is the period 1870–1910, prior to planning, “when growth tended to be about 0.2
percentage points faster in the region”. A second is the period 1973–1989, “when growth was around 0.7 percentage points
slower in the region”. Overall, the implication is that planning did not make a clear difference to growth, at least until the period
after 1973. What we do in the present paper is to show that this conclusion conceals an important difference between the
countries concerned. Initially poor countries benefited from planning; initially more prosperous countries suffered from it.1
Crafts and Toniolo (2010), taking the analysis up until 2005, have a slightly more negative verdict on planning, noting that even if
in the period from 1950–1973 “communism delivered growth rates only a little below those in Western Europe…this is not so
impressive once the much greater scope for catch-up is taken into account”(p. 300). Chief among the reasons they cite for this
discrepancy is that “the planning system rewardedmanagerswho achieved production targets in the short term rather than thosewho
found ways to reduce costs or improve the quality of output over the long term” (p. 315). More specifically, “the incentive structures
used by the Soviet leadership to motivate managers and workers were a complex mixture of rewards, punishments and monitoring.
Each of these became increasingly expensive over time,with the consequence that the viability of the systemwas threatened.” (p. 323).
Broadberry and Klein (2011) use a detailed sectoral comparison of labour productivity between the UK and Czechoslovakia to
cast light on why central planning was more successful at some tasks than at others. In particular they conclude that “central
planning was able to achieve a satisfactory productivity performance during the era of mass production, but could not adapt to
the requirements of flexible production technology during the 1980s” (p. 37). This suggests an important reason why the impact
of planning should not be expected to be the same for countries at all levels of initial development. The results we show in this
paper are entirely consistent with Broadberry and Klein's evidence about the source of planning's disadvantages; in addition we
show that the source of planning's advantages lay principally in its emphasis on infrastructure and human capital.
Our analysis takes place in three steps. First, we use cross-country data on long-run performance to see whether the
detrimental effects of the loss of market incentives when planning was imposed outweighed the potentially beneficial effects of
interference in the market allocation through forced investments in physical infrastructure and education. Contrary to the view
that planning was universally detrimental to development, we find that countries that were initially poor when they adopted
planning did no worse and probably somewhat better by the end of the central planning era than their pre-planning peers. The
countries that were relatively rich when planning was introduced, on the other hand, had levels of GDP per capita at the end of
planning that were no better and probably somewhat worse compared to their pre-planning peers. In short, against the
background of widely varying outcomes for market economies over this period, planning appears not to have worsened outcomes
across the board. It may have improved them for the countries which industrialised under planning, but it made them worse for
the countries which had already started or completed industrialising before planning began.
Whereas the first set of comparisons are made in terms of GDP per capita at the start and the end of planning, in the second
step we compare aggregate measures of infrastructure and institutions in planned economies (PEs) with their contemporary GDP
per capita market economy (ME) peers. Our 1988 snapshot tests the prediction that planning left these countries with higher
levels of both physical infrastructure and education than was the case in countries at similar levels of GDP per capita. A follow-up
1 Good and Ma do consider the relevance of initial levels of income, but the impact they examine is directly on the growth of GDP per capita. They do not
consider the relevance of initial levels of income for the impact of planning on growth. See below.
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snapshot, in 2008, provides evidence on whether differences survived well into the period of transition following the
abandonment of communism and planning in 1989–91, and also provides evidence on the institutional legacy of planning. The
aggregate indicators show that the relative over-endowment of planned economies in education and physical infrastructure still
persists 20 years after planning ended, particularly for the poorer countries. We also find some evidence that the legacy of weak
market economy institutions persists.
Although the aggregate indicators of infrastructure and institutions provide useful information about the legacy of planning,
they suffer from serious problems. First, they do not provide an accurate measure of the flow of services from the external
environment to firms. Indicators of institutional quality are particularly noisy in this regard. Second, even if we can reliably
distinguish the quality of such institutions as the rule of law in one country from that in another, this does not say anything about
whether problems with the rule of law are more or less pressing for firms than are problems with, say, electricity. To understand
whether the constraints on development left by planning were more or less important than the constraints faced by other
countries, we need a different methodology.
This takes us to the third part of our analysis, where we show how firm-level survey data can be used to assess the impact of
infrastructure, education and market institutions on firm growth. We apply the methods developed in Carlin et al. (2006, 2010) to
the comparison between formerly planned and capitalist economies. We show how firm-level data can provide evidence on the
comparative seriousness of inadequacies in a wide range of elements of the firm's physical and institutional environment. With
these methods it is possible to go beyond quantitative differences in the indicators of infrastructure and institutions that are
viewed as important for productivity growth. The question is not just whether there is more or less electricity or corruption in
formerly planned versus market economies at similar levels of development, but how large is the impact of these elements of the
external environment on firm growth. We compare the impact of both physical infrastructure and education – capturing the
“forced development hypothesis” – and of market institutions across a large sample of transition and non-transition economies.
The survey data allow us to evaluate the persistence of legacy effects in the second decade of transition and again after the phase
of rapid growth prior to the global financial crisis.
2. Planning versus the market: what do the long-run data show?
A longstanding theme in the analysis of centrally planned economies is that of “static efficiency” versus “dynamic efficiency”.
The latter term, in this context, refers to growth and the rate of technological change. The Soviet Union, in this perspective,
suffered from large static inefficiencies deriving from the many allocative failures of central planning, but nevertheless could –
and initially did – grow quickly because central planning was an effective mechanism for achieving high rates of capital
accumulation and the absorption of new technologies.
A more modern version of this theme is to place the long-run growth of centrally planned economies in the context of
technological catching-up. A poor country that adopted central planning could initially grow rapidly because of rapid industrialisation
and high rates of investment in human and physical capital and infrastructure. Eventually, however, growth slows down because of
catching-up and because capital stops growing faster than output. At this point, the static inefficiencies inherent in central planning
dominate, and the country reaches an equilibriumproductivity gap vis-à-vis the developedmarket economies (Gomulka 1986, 1988).
An interesting light is cast on the process by which central planning might lead to initially rapid growth in poor countries by
the recent work of Allen (2012). He argues that the “great divergence” in national economic growth in the last nearly two
centuries has been characterised by an almost complete lack of technical progress in the poorest countries: “It is remarkable that
countries in 1990 with low capital labor ratios achieved an output per worker that was no higher than countries with the same
capital labor ratio in 1820”. This is counter-intuitive from a perspective that sees initial technological backwardness as providing
intrinsically favourable conditions for catch-up due to imitation. It is due, he claims, to the fact that new techniques invented in
rich countries are typically profitable to adopt only at the high wages characteristic of these countries. Poor countries can
therefore grow not by imitation but only by saving. At first they adopt old technologies previously invented in countries that are
now rich but were poor at the time of the invention (he cites the example of sewing machines, developed in the 1850s and still in
use in poor countries today). Only after these countries have crawled up the world production function through saving will their
wages rise by enough to make it worthwhile adopting technologies that represent genuine technical progress.
This suggests (though Allen does not draw the conclusion explicitly in his 2012 paper2) that central planning was able to
accelerate the process of catch-up by poor countries, in three main ways. First, by mobilizing domestic savings more effectively than
the financial systems ofmarket economies. Secondly, by raising the rate of return to the adoption ofmodern technologies at any given
level of real wages through infrastructure investments (such as in transport and energy) that reduce technical inefficiencies in
production and increase the effective size ofmarkets. And finally, by raising realwages through directed investment in human capital.
In this perspective, the legacy of central planning depends on where a country was in the industrialisation or catching-up
process at the time it adopted planning, and on the counterfactual – what would have happened had the country not adopted
planning? For countries that were already relatively rich and largely industrialised at the time central planning was adopted, the
natural counterfactual is that they would have continued to be members of the developed-economy convergence club. The
benefits to these countries of high rates of investment in human capital and physical infrastructure would have been relatively
2 However, Allen's (2003) book suggests that Tsarist Russia was missing the institutional prerequisites for successful industrialisation, and that Soviet-type
central planning was able to substitute for these gaps.
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limited, and the costs of the allocative inefficiencies of central planning substantial. Similarly, in the post-planning transition era,
the costs to these countries of inheriting poor economic institutions would be expected to be substantial.
On the other hand, for countries that were very poor and essentially pre-industrial at the time planning was imposed, the
counterfactual is not obvious. These countries might have industrialised anyway if their savings rates had been sufficiently high,
or they might have remained members of the poor-country (non-) convergence club.3 Under the first counterfactual, the legacy of
central planning would have been very costly, just as it was for the relatively rich countries that adopted planning. Under the
second counterfactual, the legacy of central planning could actually be beneficial, so long as the industrialisation under central
planning was not reversed after its removal; furthermore, the poor quality institutions inherited from the planning era would be
no worse than the institutions under the counterfactual scenario where the country failed to start sustained catching-up. One way
to see which of these two counterfactuals is more likely is to estimate the relationship between initial income and subsequent
outcomes separately for countries that adopted planning and for those that remained market economies. A comparison of the two
estimated relationships allows us to answer questions such as “Did initially poor countries that adopted planning grow faster than
similarly poor countries that remained market economies?” and “Does the answer change if the comparison is between countries
that were initially rich instead of initially poor?” This is the exercise we report in this section.
Countries adopted Soviet-style planning at two points in the 20th century. The first group consists of the early adopters:
now-independent countries that were part of the Soviet Unionwhen the basic structures of central planningwere introduced by Stalin
in 1928. The second group of late adopterswere countries in Eastern Europe (including 4 countries thatwere also formally incorporated
into the Soviet Union), where socialist planningwas imported or imposed following the SecondWorldWar. Because of the disruptions
of the two world wars, we choose 1913 and 1937 as our pre-planning comparison years for the early and late adopters, respectively.
Furthermore, we undertake the comparison separately for each group of countries. Given that the early adopters and the late adopters
were exposed to central planning for different periods of time, pooling them for the purposes of making a single comparison is
problematic. In addition, we do not want to be committed to a view about the comparability of real incomes measured in 1913 with
thosemeasured in 1937.We also do not wish our comparisons to depend on assumptions about whether themore important factor in
determining catch-up potential is the absolute level of income (Allen) or the distance to the technological frontier (Gomulka, Good &
Ma). For all of these reasons we compare each group of adopters with a comparator group of similar incomes in the same initial year,
and look separately, for early and late adopters, at whether relative performance depended on the initial level of income.
Both groups of countries were quite heterogeneous in terms of level of development prior to the adoption of planning. The
group of early adopters includes countries such as Russia where industrialisation had already started, and the Central Asian
countries, which were extremely poor and essentially still pre-industrial agricultural/nomadic societies. The late adopters were
more heterogeneous still, ranging from the industrialised Czech Republic (then part of Czechoslovakia) to very poor and still
agricultural Balkan countries. It is this cross-sectional variation in initial income in both groups of countries that enables us to
answer the question posed above, namely, how did the impact of adopting planning depend on the initial level of development?
We use long-run cross-country data on GDP per capita to examine both the effect of exposure to planning and its
abandonment on comparative development. Our data for 1913 and 1937 derive from Maddison (2009) and are presented in
Tables 1a and 1b. Maddison's estimates do not disaggregate the then Russian Empire, USSR, Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia,4 so our
figures for the initial years include a large number of estimates; full details are in Appendix A.1. The general picture and results,
however, are not very sensitive to the assumptions used.
When looking at both early and late adopters we use two sets of comparator countries that did not adopt planning. The first,
larger set includes all countries in Maddison's database in the base year (1913 or 1937) with a level of GDP that is no higher than
20% above that of the richest country in the group that adopted planning (in 1913, Russia; in 1937, Estonia and Latvia). The
second set is a subset of the first and its composition is motivated by the geographical patterns in convergence clubs: we include
only countries in Europe and Western, Central and Southern Asia (EWCSA).
The results are presented in two sets of scatterplots, one for the early adopters and one for the late adopters (Fig. 1). In all
cases, the horizontal axis is log GDP per capita in the base year (1913 or 1937). The vertical axis is the outcome – the level of
development, proxied by GDP per capita – at the very end of the planning era, in 1988, and also after nearly two decades of
transition, in 2008. Countries that adopted planning are in red upper-case letters; comparator EWCSA countries are in blue
upper-case letters; and comparator countries from elsewhere in the world are in blue lower-case letters. The scatterplots include
regression lines corresponding to the three country samples (unbroken lines for countries that experienced planning, dashed
lines for all comparators, and dashed-dotted lines for EWCSA comparators only).
The scatterplots clearly suggest the legacy of planning is quite different for the countries that were relatively poor when planning
was adopted as compared with those that were relatively rich when planning was adopted. By 1988, the very poorest adopters of
planningwere as rich, or richer, than the countries that had similar levels of income in 1913 and 1937. The richest adopters of planning,
by contrast, were no better off, or poorer, than their comparators. This pattern did not disappear with the abandonment of planning: it
is still apparent in the levels of income of planned economies and their capitalist (or market economy) comparators in 2008.
The differences between the estimated regression lines in Fig. 1 can be tested formally by estimating a simple linear
regression:
ln GDPt2ð Þ ¼ β0 þ β1PLANi þ β2 ln GDPt1ð Þ þ β3 PLANi  ln GDPt1ð Þ½  þ ei; ð1Þ
3 See Allen (2003, chapter 2) for a discussion of the possible counterfactuals for the case of Soviet industrialisation.
4 Though Broadberry and Klein (2008) do provide a separate estimate for Russia in 1913 which we make use of; see Appendix Notes A1.
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where PLANi is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the country adopted central planning and t1 and t2 refer to the initial
reference year and the end year, respectively. The key difference between this formulation and that reported by Good and Ma
(1999) is the inclusion of the interaction term β3[PLANi* ln(GDPt1)]. Good and Ma are concerned with the differential growth
performance between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and their comparator countries, and they employ a
specification with a catching-up effect common to planned and market economies; in our Eq. (1) above, this is equivalent to
focusing on β1 and assuming β3=0. Our more general specification in effect allows for a wider range of possibilities: for instance,
poor countries with central planning could initially grow more quickly than similarly poor market economies (converge in
income towards the developed market economies), and at the same time richer (less poor) planned countries could grow more
slowly than their market economy comparators.5
5 More precisely, Good and Ma estimate a model where the dependent variable is the rate of growth and the explanatory variables include a regional dummy
for Central and Eastern Europe (their focus) and a measure of the productivity gap between the country and the technological leader (taken to be the US). Because
all the observations in our separate early- and late-adopter estimations share a common starting year, our use of the level of GDP per capita in the initial year
corresponds to the measure of the productivity gap in their formulation. Other differences are that Good and Ma consider a narrower range of counties – Central
and Eastern Europe vs. other European countries – and a wider range of time periods, including those prior to the planning experience.
Table 1a
GDP per capita in central planning: early adopters and comparators.
Country Code 1913 1988 2008
Early adopters
Armenia ARM 1669 3154 5615
Azerbaijan AZE 1669 6075 8024
Belarus BLR 2135 6669 11,747
Georgia GEO 1669 7780 4516
Kazakhstan KAZ 925 7219 10,469
Kyrgyz Republic KGZ 925 2395 2043
Russian Federation RUS 2135 13,066 14,767
Tajikistan TJK 925 3363 1781
Turkmenistan TKM 925 4098 6326
Ukraine UKR 2135 8348 6721
Uzbekistan UZB 1376 2004 2455
Comparators, Europe & West/Central/South Asia
Bangladesh BGD 925 723 1356
Greece GRC 2190 17,045 26,900
India IND 925 1159 2781
Iran, Islamic Rep. IRN 1376 5440 10,398
Iraq IRQ 1376 6478 3560
Jordan JOR 1376 4051 5108
Lebanon LBN 1857 8044 11,017
Nepal NPL 742 682 1021
Pakistan PAK 925 1569 2317
Portugal PRT 1721 14,625 21,962
Sri Lanka LKA 1698 1877 4150
Syrian Arab Republic SYR 1858 3263 4512
Turkey TUR 1669 7642 12,406
Comparators, Other
Algeria DZA 1601 6213 7367
Brazil BRA 1116 7519 9583
Colombia COL 1701 5784 8250
Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY 1241 3047 5216
Ghana GHA 1074 882 1380
Hong Kong SAR, China HKG 1760 22,617 40,579
Indonesia IDN 1203 1749 3570
Jamaica JAM 837 5388 7344
Japan JPN 1908 23,665 31,307
Korea, Rep. KOR 1196 9977 25,517
Malaysia MYS 1239 5884 12,930
Mexico MEX 2383 9497 12,932
Morocco MAR 977 2625 3973
Myanmar MMR 943 1042 4275
Peru PER 1421 5573 7967
Philippines PHL 1360 2453 3382
Singapore SGP 1760 22,187 47,995
South Africa ZAF 2204 8154 9602
Taiwan TWN 1007 12,544 30,476
Thailand THA 1157 3251 7378
Tunisia TUN 1215 3797 7357
Venezuela, RB VEN 1519 10,311 11,756
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Eq. (1) is estimated using OLS with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. The results are shown in Table 2a. The estimated
β^3, the coefficient on the interaction term [PLANi* ln(GDPt1)], is negative in all eight estimations and significantly different from
zero in six, suggesting our more general specification is warranted. The finding that β^3b0 – visible as the flatter estimated
Table 1b
GDP per capita in central planning: late adopters and comparators.
Country Code 1937 1988 2008
Late adopters
Albania ALB 1578 4058 7223
Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH 1391 2797 5382
Bulgaria BGR 2156 8323 12,005
Croatia HRV 1947 14,446 17,317
Czech Republic CZE 4622 16,510 23,223
Estonia EST 4735 10,641 18,646
Hungary HUN 3499 12,551 17,442
Latvia LVA 4735 10,381 15,662
Lithuania LTU 2636 12,986 17,616
Macedonia, FYR MKD 1202 9290 8786
Moldova MDA 1659 4516 2768
Poland POL 2636 9251 16,455
Romania ROU 1659 8896 11,793
Serbia and Montenegro SAM 1515 10,474 7130
Slovak Republic SVK 1942 12,647 20,515
Slovenia SVN 3184 17,986 27,197
Comparators, Europe & West/Central/South Asia
Austria AUT 4343 24,111 36,193
Finland FIN 4735 22,064 33,626
Greece GRC 3810 17,045 26,900
India IND 930 1159 2781
Ireland IRL 4069 15,246 38,955
Italy ITA 4568 22,569 28,168
Norway NOR 5770 31,440 48,557
Pakistan PAK 930 1569 2317
Portugal PRT 2418 14,625 21,962
Spain ESP 2488 18,240 28,340
Sri Lanka LKA 1715 1877 4150
Turkey TUR 2219 7642 12,406
Comparators, Other
Argentina ARG 5677 8499 13,276
Brazil BRA 1720 7519 9583
Chile CHL 4378 5948 13,394
Colombia COL 2409 5784 8250
Costa Rica CRI 2479 6016 10,367
Ecuador ECU 1790 5565 7251
El Salvador SLV 1465 3577 6275
Guatemala GTM 3036 3254 4365
Honduras HND 1463 2695 3636
Indonesia IDN 1540 1749 3570
Jamaica JAM 1338 5388 7344
Japan JPN 3186 23,665 31,307
Korea, Rep. KOR 2149 9977 25,517
Malaysia MYS 1801 5884 12,930
Mexico MEX 2471 9497 12,932
Myanmar MMR 1086 1042 4275
Nicaragua NIC 1449 2006 2494
Paraguay PRY 2606 3872 4352
Peru PER 2650 5573 7967
Philippines PHL 1965 2453 3382
Taiwan TWN 1732 12,544 30,476
Uruguay URY 4764 7296 11,675
Notes to Tables 1a and 1b.
All figures are in US $2005 international dollars. 1913 and 1937 GDP per capita are from Maddison (2009) in US $1990, converted to US $2005 using US GDP in
1990 from Maddison (in $1990) and World Bank (WB) World Development Indicators (WDI) (in $2005), except for selected planned economies, which are from
Broadberry and Klein (2008), also in US $1990 and converted to US $2005. 1988 and 2008 derive from World Bank WDI, in turn derived from the ICP Project.
Various figures for 1913, 1937 and 1988 are estimates by the authors. See Appendix A.1 for details.
The 1913 market economy sample consists of all market economies in Maddison with an estimated GDP per capita in 1913 of no more than 20% more (in log
terms) than the richest planned economy (Russia, source Broadberry-Klein; see Appendix for further details). China was also excluded. No lower limit was used.
The 1937 market economy sample consists of all market economies in Maddison with an estimated GDP per capita in 1937 of at most 20% more (in log terms)
than the richest planned economy (Estonia and Latvia, estimated to have the same GDP per capita as Finland; see Appendix for further details). China was also
excluded. No lower limit was used.
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relationships for planned economies in Fig. 1 – is evidence that the effect of central planning was significantly more negative the
richer the country was before planning was imposed.
We can also use the results of the estimation of Eq. (1) to test the difference in log GDP per capita between planned andmarket
economies at the end date for a range of values Y of initial GDP per capita (Table 2b). In other words, we estimate the difference in
value of β^0 þ β^3Y for the two groups of countries – the vertical distance between the corresponding two regression lines in Fig. 1,
measured at a chosen initial income Y – and test its statistical significance. The values Y at which we choose to test the difference
correspond to the lowest and highest observed incomes among the countries that would adopt planning in the relevant group of
adopters: $925 and $2125 per capita in 1913 (early adopters), and $1200 and $4750 in 1937 (late adopters). The table shows that
in 1988, the poorest countries that adopted planning had, on average, incomes that were 53–102% higher (in log percentage
points) than their comparators, depending on the composition of the comparison (early or late adopters, all comparators or just
EWCSA countries); three of these four comparisons are statistically significant. The four comparisons involving the richer
adopters show that their incomes in 1988 were, on average, 14–57% lower than their comparators; two of these comparisons are
statistically significant. By 2008, the gap for the poorest adopters had decreased, but the gap for the richest adopters had
increased.
In sum: initially poor countries ended planning no worse off, and if anything, better off, than their pre-planning peers; but any
advantage was less visible in 2008, after the planning collapse and the partial and unevenly spread recovery. Initially rich
countries ended planning no better off, and if anything, worse off, than their pre-planning peers; and this disadvantage was still
more visible in 2008.
This pattern is consistent with the view that central planning could generate rapid growth in initially poor and
unindustrialised countries via the mobilisation of resources and high rates of investment in physical and human capital and
public infrastructure. When planning was abandoned, poorer countries should therefore have been relatively well-endowed with
physical infrastructure and human capital compared to market economies with similar incomes. In the already-industrialised,
Fig. 1. Long-run growth for economies exposed and not exposed to Soviet-style planning.
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richer countries that adopted planning, the additional mobilisation of resources had fewer payoffs. The legacy of weak institutions
would therefore have weighed more heavily on these richer countries.
In the next section we consider the aggregate evidence from 1988 and from 2008 for the existence of legacies of physical and
human capital, public infrastructure, and economic institutions in the planned economies.
3. The long shadow of communism: how normal were the planned economies?
In this section we compare the level of physical infrastructure and human capital, and the quality of a range of public inputs
and market institutions believed to be important for the growth of firms, between planned and market economies at the end of
the planning period and in the second decade of transition to the market economy. Relative to their GDP per capita peers that had
not experienced planning, did the legacy of decades with non-market allocations still affect the quality of market institutions after
more than a decade and a half of transition to the market economy? This set of cross-country comparisons helps clarify whether
planning left traces of the kind suggested by the hypothesis of forced investment, how long they lasted and how quickly deficits in
market institutions were overcome.
We present scatterplots of public inputs in planned and market economies against GDP per capita, and again fit simple linear
regressions to these data using OLS. We estimate the gaps at a low and high level of GDP per capita, defined as, respectively, the
level of the poorest planned economy in the sample and at the level of the richest planned economy in the sample, from a simple
cross-country equation of the form:
Bj ¼ β0 þ β1PLANi þ β2 ln GDPið Þ þ β3 PLANi  ln GDPið Þ½  þ ei; ð2Þ
where Bj is a measure of the public input in country j.
Fig. 1 (continued).
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For physical infrastructure and education, quantitative indicators are available as proxy measures of the supply of public
inputs at country level at the end of central planning. In Fig. 2 we compare the endowments of physical infrastructure and
enrolment in secondary education in the former planned economies and market economies when communism collapsed. The
indicators are electricity generation, railway track, telephone mainlines, and secondary school enrolment (% of cohort).
Comparisons between planned and market economies are reported in Table 3 for a low and high level of GDP per capita. In all
cases the provision in poor planned economies in 1988 was higher than was the case for market economies. These endowments of
physical and human capital persisted from the planning era into transition in the poorer countries: in 2008, the poorer formerly
planned economies had substantially more of all four types of inputs than their market economy comparators. The richer planned
economies, however, were less well-endowed versus their market comparators: in 1988, they had more railway lines and
modestly more human capital, but no more electricity generation capacity and fewer telephone lines; and by 2008, if anything,
less human capital than their market economy comparators.
Table 2b
Regression-based estimates of the impact of planning on long-run development.
Ref year End year Sample $925 $1200 $2125 $4750 #Obs:
PEs/MEs/All
1913 1988 All 0.53 −0.56* 11/35/46
1913 1988 E & WCSA 1.02** −0.46 11/13/24
1937 1988 All 0.93** −0.14 16/34/50
1937 1988 E & WCSA 1.01** −0.57** 16/12/28
1913 2008 All −0.07 −0.72** 11/35/46
1913 2008 E & WCSA 0.56 −0.63* 11/13/24
1937 2008 All 0.44 −0.07 16/34/50
1937 2008 E & WCSA 0.49* −0.54** 16/12/28
*=sig at 10%.
**=sig at 5%.
Notes to Tables 2a and 2b.
The values chosen for Y correspond to the min and max GDP per capita at PPP in 2005 $US for the early and late planned economy adopters.
Min planned economy GDP per capita in 1913: $925 (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, calibrated to Maddison estimate of India).
Max planned economy GDP per capita in 1913: $2135 (Russia, source Broadberry-Klein. NB: Maddison estimate for total FSU in 1913=$2047).
Min planned economy GDP per capita in 1937: $1202 (Macedonia, based on Maddison 1937 estimate for Yugoslavia and 1953 relative social product per head for
the separate Yugoslav republics).
Max planned economy GDP per capita in 1937: $4735 (Estonia and Latvia, calibrated to Maddison estimate for Finland and NEBI yearbook assessment of prewar
living standards).
E & WCSA=market economy sample includes Europe and West/Central/South Asia only.
See Appendix A.1 for notes on the data.
Table 2a
The impact of planning on long-run development: regression estimates for Table 2b and Fig. 1.
Full sample, 1913–1988 EWCSA only, 1913–1988 Full sample 1937–1988 EWCSA only, 1937–1988
Ln(GDPt1) 2.22*** 2.68*** 1.41*** 1.78***
(0.46) (0.40) (0.20) (0.13)
PLAN*Ln(GDPt1) −1.31** −1.77*** −0.78** −1.16***
(0.58) (0.55) (0.32) (0.28)
PLAN 9.50** 13.11*** 6.48** 9.20***
(4.25) (3.95) (2.486) (2.27)
Constant −7.55** −11.17*** −2.19 −4.92***
(3.32) (2.82) (1.58) (1.09)
R-squared 0.44 0.65 0.57 0.76
N 46 24 50 28
Full sample, 1913–2008 EWCSA only, 1913–2008 Full sample 1937–2008 EWCSA only, 1937–2008
Ln(GDPt1) 1.88*** 2.53*** 1.28*** 1.66***
(0.47) (0.39) (0.19) (0.11)
PLAN*Ln(GDPt1) −0.79 −1.45* −0.37 −0.75***
(0.74) (0.71) (0.29) (0.25)
PLAN 5.33 10.46* 3.04 5.77***
(5.42) (5.18) (2.27) (2.04)
Constant −4.59 −9.72*** −0.69 −3.42***
(3.43) (2.74) (1.43) (0.90)
R-squared 0.35 0.60 0.51 0.78
N 46 24 50 28
* pb0.10, ** pb0.05, *** pb0.01.
Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses.
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In short, according to the aggregate indicator data, formerly planned economies, especially poor ones where industrialisation
took place under planning, entered transition with higher levels of physical infrastructure and human capital than was
characteristic of market economies at a similar level of development. To the extent that GDP per capita was overstated in the
planned economies, these positive infrastructure endowment gaps were even larger.
An important caveat to these findings is that the aggregate indicators do not provide an accurate measure of the flow of
services from public inputs. This is especially troubling in interpreting the post-communist experience. For example, it is clear
from Fig. 2 that railway networks throughout the transition period were very extensive in the former planned economies relative
to their market economy peers – this was true right across the GDP per capita distribution. However, these networks were geared
to the transportation of freight between enterprises according to the Plan. The supply-chains linked by the rail network often
Fig. 2. Levels of physical infrastructure and schooling – planned and market economies, 1988 and 2008. Source: World Bank,World Development Indicators, except
electricity generation capacity, which is from the US Energy Information Administration.
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collapsed when planning and the trading arrangements in the CMEAwere abandoned and the value of the remaining rail network
to firms in the market economy is almost certainly not well-measured by the kilometres of track per capita (see EBRD, 1996).
Similarly, it is not straightforward to measure the value of human capital acquired under the central planning regime. We return
to this measurement problem shortly.
Although there is an extensive literature describing shortcomings in market-economy institutions at the outset of transition
(e.g. Roland, 2000, Svejnar, 2002), quantitative indicators of gaps in institutional inputs are more difficult to find. There are a
number of country-level proxy indicators of the business environment, each with a somewhat different focus. Examples that have
Fig. 2 (continued).
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been widely used in the economics and political science literature are the World Bank's World Governance and Doing Business
indicators, and the Economic Freedom indicators produced by the Heritage Foundation and by the Fraser Institute.
Appendix Table A1 summarises the nature of the data sources used and the methods by which these four different sets of
aggregate indicators are compiled.
Unfortunately data of this kind rarely provide a clear or informative picture. Sometimes this is because measures from
different sources tell inconsistent messages. Fig. 3 illustrates, using two aspects of the business environment (trade and
corruption), and comparing the results for the three sources where data for the particular aspect are reported. World Bank
Governance, Heritage and Fraser produce a rating of the business environment related to corruption (top row of charts in Fig. 3).
Although the results are very noisy, the patterns are consistent across indicators: formerly planned economies score more poorly
than do market ones at similar levels of GDP per capita. Unfortunately, inconsistencies across indicators are also common. Doing
Business, Heritage and Fraser all report an indicator related to trade (Fig. 3, lower row of charts). Higher GDP per capita is
associated with a better score on the indicator in each case. However, unlike the corruption example, different indicators of the
Table 3
Planned/Market economy gaps in stocks of physical infrastructure and secondary school enrolment, 1988 and 2008.
Physical infrastructure and human capital Low income PE $ Market Planned Difference High income PE $ Market Planned Difference Countries
End of planning: 1988
Log rail route km per capita 3154 −8.87 −8.20 0.66** 17,986 −7.92 −7.09 0.83** 79
Log tel. lines per 10,000 pop 2004 −4.62 −2.93 1.69** 17,986 −1.44 −1.79 −0.35* 185
Log electr. gen. cap. GW per capita 2004 −16.42 −14.34 2.08** 17,986 −13.67 −13.59 0.08 165
Percent enrolment in secondary school 2004 36.02 101.97 65.95** 17,986 81.57 88.86 7.29* 122
After two decades of transition: 2008
Log rail route km per capita 1781 −9.73 −8.96 0.77** 27,197 −8.07 −6.98 1.09** 100
Log tel. lines per 10,000 pop 1781 −3.93 −2.39 1.54** 27,197 −0.92 −0.91 0.01 199
Log electr. gen. cap. GW per capita 1781 −16.67 −14.62 2.06** 27,197 −13.43 −13.41 0.02 178
Percent enrolment in secondary school 1781 49.14 87.68 38.54** 27,197 101.93 95.84 −6.09* 152
Source: As for Fig. 1.
* = significant at 5%.
** = significant at 1%.
“Low income PE $”=GDP per capita in PPP $2005 of lowest-income planned economy in estimation sample.
“High income PE $”=GDP per capita in PPP $2005 of highest-income planned economy in estimation sample.
Fig. 3. Measures of the business environment (corruption and trade) in planned and market economies. Sources: See Table A1.
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environment for engaging in trade point in different directions regarding comparisons between formerly planned and market
economies. The Fraser indicator shows no difference between planned andmarket economies; the Doing Business indicator suggests
that the environment for international trade is less good in poor formerly planned economies than in poor market economies; and
the Heritage index suggests the opposite. Such examples are not uncommon, and even where the data from different sources are
consistent they are often noisy and hard to relate in systematic ways to other aspects of the economies in question.
To summarise: at the end of planning the low-income planned economies look much better endowed with physical
infrastructure and human capital than similarly low-incomemarket economies, and this difference has persisted quantitatively as
well as qualitatively through 2008. The difference in these endowments in the richer countries that experienced planning was
smaller at the end of planning than in their market economy comparators, and smaller still by 2008. However, there are questions
about how well these measures capture the value of the flow of services from these public inputs. The picture with respect to
market institutions is much less clear still, in large part because the indicators are noisy and sometimes inconsistent.
There is a further caveat to this aggregate evidence. Since the distortions under planning were potentially positive for future
growth prospects in relation to infrastructure and education and negative in relation to market institutions, we would like to
make comparisons across types of public input between the economies that were exposed to planning and those that were not.
This cannot be readily done using aggregate indicators because of the “curse of dimensionality”. There are too few countries and
too many potential determinants of growth that vary at the country level for us to be able to estimate precisely the different
impacts (Durlauf et al., 2005). Even if we can reliably distinguish the quality of such institutions as the rule of law in one country
from that in another, this does not say anything about whether problems with the rule of law are more or less of a constraint on
private sector growth than are problems with, say, electricity.
In the next section we show how microeconomic data from surveys of firms can be used to address these problems.
4. Measuring the impact of the external environment on firms using firm-level survey data
For more than a decade, the EBRD and the World Bank have been conducting surveys of thousands of firms around the world,
asking managers inter alia about aspects of the business environment in which their firms operate. The usual approach to
employing these survey data to measure the impact of infrastructure, institutions and other public inputs is to estimate a
regression in which a measure of firm performance is the dependent variable, and measures of the business environment are
included as regressors. A simple example would be a production function estimation in which the dependent variable is firm
output and the independent variables are the firm's capital, labour, and what the firm reports about an aspect of the business
environment, e.g., whether or not corruption is an important problem. Dethier et al. (2010) provide a survey of this literature.6
Commander and Svejnar (2011) and Commander and Nikoloski (2011) analyse formerly planned economies and are the most
relevant studies of this kind.
The above approach is problematic for several reasons (Carlin et al., 2006, 2010), the most important of which in our context is
again the “curse of dimensionality”. Public inputs typically vary primarily at the country level (or regional level in large countries).
This means that even with large numbers of firms, the sample size is actually small: because all the firms in a country face the
same set of institutions, it is the number of countries rather than the number of firms that drives the effective sample size. The
empirical challenges of this approach are therefore effectively the same as those facing studies using aggregate data: there are too
few different country experiences, and too many imperfectly measured and correlated indicators, to be able to precisely identify
the causal impacts of different public inputs on output and growth.
To understand whether planning left countries with different constraints on growth from their non-planning peers, we
therefore employ a new methodology proposed by Carlin et al. (2006, 2010).7 The data come from the business environment
surveys conducted by the EBRD and World Bank between 2002 and 2010.8 A standard question was asked in which managers
were required to evaluate the importance for the operation and growth of their business of a broad range of public inputs. In the
context of the formerly planned economies, these data are attractive because they come mainly from small and medium-sized
firms, providing a window into the value to these new entrants in the post-planning period of the inherited infrastructure (such
as the railway network), and of the emerging market institutions.
The enterprise surveys collect a range of “Subjective Severity” indicators from firms. These are responses to questions about a
feature of the business environment faced by the firm, where the question takes the form, “How much of an obstacle is X to the
operation and growth of your business?”, and the respondent rates the severity on a 5-point scale of 0 (“no obstacle”) to 4 (“very
severe obstacle”). The dimensions of the external environment asked about and which we refer to as public inputs include the
following: telecoms, electricity, transport, skills availability, macroeconomic/political/policy stability, tax administration, customs
administration, labour regulation, the court system, corruption and crime.9
A simple and intuitive interpretation of the responses to these questions is that these are the firm's assessments of the costs it
incurs because of operating in an environment with poor-quality public inputs. In contrast to their use on the right hand side of a
6 Among other studies using an augmented production function approach with the various subsets of the business environment survey data are Beck et al.
(2005), Hallward-Driemeier, et al. (2006), Dollar et al. 2005 and Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido, 2009.
7 See also Carlin and Schaffer (2012) for an application of this methodology to firms and the business environment in South Asia.
8 The data and documentation are openly available at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.
9 Although questions are asked in the survey about tax rates and access to finance, we exclude them from the analysis because they do not have the character of
public inputs (Carlin et al. 2010). We also exclude the question about competition since the wording changed substantially over time and surveys.
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production function as proxies for the flows of services from various public inputs, this interpretation (following Carlin et al. 2006,
2010) sees them as shadow prices. The shadow price interpretation rests on the assumption that firms have a notion of the flows
of services from the different elements of their business environment, and that their answer puts a value on them in terms of their
impact on profitability. If a firm reported, say, the court system as an important obstacle, this can be interpreted as a high shadow
price: a relaxation of this constraint via an improved court system would therefore be expected to reduce the shadow price and
lead to higher profits and increased output. If most firms in a country report that the court system is an important obstacle, then
the high average shadow price allows us to infer that this particular public input is underprovided.10
By using a framework in which we observe firm valuations of public inputs directly, we circumvent the problems that arise in a
standard production function approach where values of different public inputs are inferred from the estimated impacts on output.
We show how the firm valuations can be readily aggregated and compared across countries and across inputs. The result is a set of
equations, which we take to the data to answer questions about legacy effects by comparing formerly planned and market
countries. Fig. 4 summarises the way we shall interpret the data. On the horizontal axis is GDP per capita. On the vertical axis is
the reported cost of a public input (R), e.g. the court system, averaged across all firms in the country. We interpret this as the
mean shadow price of the public input to the firms in the country. In the example in Fig. 4, we see that firms in formerly planned
economies at both low and high country income levels report higher shadow prices (e.g. of using the court system) than do firms
in market economies. We can also see that in this illustrative example the disadvantage of firms in formerly planned economies
(denoted by Diff) through the bigger burden imposed by deficiencies in the court system is larger in low (L) income countries
than in high (H) income countries, shown in the diagram by Diff L>Diff H.
In the next subsection, we set out the model behind Fig. 4. We then explain the data we use to construct the measures of R, the
reported costs of public input constraints, and this is followed by a description of the econometric strategy that allows us to go
from the individual firm survey responses to construct country-level estimates of reported costs and to test for differences
between planned and market economies at different income levels. In Section 5, we report the results for the legacy hypotheses
using these data and methods.
4.1. Model
As explained in more detail in the appendix (Appendix A.2) we use a model where public inputs are included in the private
production function of a firm. Following Carlin et al. (2006, 2010) we interpret the answers to the subjective severity questions as
reflecting the shadow price of public inputs. We use a simple single-period firm production function with two inputs, N and B,
which are combined to produce output Y. N is employment; it is a variable input with no adjustment costs. B is the flow of services
from a public input. We normalize the price of output Y to 1. Firms differ in productivity, captured by a multiplicative productivity
parameter A. We index countries by j and firms by i. We assume the public input is supplied on identical terms to all firms in a
country, so we write it as Bj. Although the aggregate measures reported in Section 2 may capture some aspects of Bj, the flow of
public inputs to the firm is not observable. Bj captures the notion of a shared “business environment”. The production function
is:
Yij ¼ AijF Nij; Bj
 
: ð3Þ
Firms choose employment, N, to maximize profits π for given technology A, public input B, and relative price of labour, wj. As
we show in the appendix, this leads to an estimating equation linking the reported shadow price of the public input and the level
10 An important implication of the shadow price interpretation for firm-level studies is that it is inappropriate to include the scores as indicators of the flow of
services on the right hand side when estimating a production function. See Carlin et al. (2006, 2010) for further discussion.
Fig. 4. Framework for using firm-level survey data to measure the shadow costs to firms of their external environment.
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of country GDP as follows:
Rij ¼ δ0 þ δ1Aj þ δ2PLANj þ δ3 PLANj  Aj
 
þ υij; ð4Þ
where Rij is the reported shadow price of the public input by firm i in country j, and Āj is the mean country level of firm
productivity, proxied here by country GDP per capita.
This allows us to answer the question whether there are differences in firm valuations of a given public input between
formerly planned andmarket economies at comparable incomes, without needing to measure the supply of public inputs directly,
i.e. the Bjs. Since we allow both position and the slope of the income-public input relationship to differ between planned and
market economies as illustrated in Fig. 4, the answer to the question depends on the level of income where we are making the
comparison. We choose the same two reference incomes as in Section 2 for our comparison, ĀL=log($3,500) and ĀH=
log($16,500), with L indicating “low-income” and H indicating “high-income”.
The parameter values obtained by estimating Eq. (4) combined with these reference income levels generate the following
predicted values for low-income (L) and high-income (H) planned (P) and market (M) economies:
R^LM ¼ δ^0 þ δ^1AL; ð5Þ
R^HM ¼ δ^0 þ δ^1AH ; ð6Þ
R^LP ¼ δ^0 þ δ^2
 
þ δ^1 þ δ^3
 
AL; ð7Þ
R^HP ¼ δ^0 þ δ^2
 
þ δ^1 þ δ^3
 
AH : ð8Þ
These four predicted values are statistics, and can be readily compared using standard least squares regression and hypothesis
tests. We are interested in particular in the following comparisons, illustrated in Fig. 4, which capture how the impacts on firms of
provision of the public input in question differ between planned and market economies at similar income levels, (Diff L and Diff
H). Note that Diff>0 indicates that the burden on firms is larger in formerly planned economies than in market economies, and
that Diffb0 indicates that the burden in PEs is lower than in MEs, at the reference income level;
Diff L≡ R^LP−R^LM ¼ δ^2 þ δ^3AL
 
ð9Þ
DiffH≡ R^HP−R^HM ¼ δ^2 þ δ^3AH
 
: ð10Þ
Finally, we can use the fitted values to test the differences in the rankings of the reported costs of different public inputs. How
do the shadow prices of different public inputs compare in low-income planned and market economies and how do these
rankings change with income? We construct four sets of rankings of public inputs from the four sets of fitted values R^LP , R^HP , R^LM
and R^HM . The statistical tests of the rankings are simple Wald tests of the differences between these fitted values. For example, if a
public input such as the court system is ranked above another public input such as electricity for low-income ex-planned
economies, we report whether the difference R^LP;courts−R^LP;electricity
 
is significant, and similarly for the other categories of
countries.
4.2. Data
The surveys used here were conducted over a period of 9 years, from 2002 to 2010, and covered around 62,000 manufacturing
firms in 202 separate surveys in 111 countries (see Appendix Table A2). Basic statistics on the surveys are presented in Table 4.
Most of the surveyed firms are small or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); mean log employment is about 35 persons. Most of the
data on firms in formerly planned economies, and a small number of surveys of firms in market economies, were collected in the
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS) conducted by EBRD; data on firms from the rest of the world,
and a handful of additional surveys for transition countries, come from theWorld Bank's Enterprise Surveys (ES) programme. The
original surveys collect data from both manufacturing and services firms. We limit our analysis to privately owned manufacturing
firms to reduce the heterogeneity in the sample; the results of the analysis are in any case very similar when extended to include
firms in services. Roughly 17% of the sample, or about 10,000 firms, were drawn from formerly planned economies. Slightly more
than half of formerly planned economy firms in the sample were surveyed between 2002 and 2005 (BEEPS II and III, plus a
handful of non-BEEPS surveys). Another survey of firms in formerly planned economies (BEEPS IV) was conducted in 2007–09.
We present below two separate analyses. First, we test for legacy effects using the findings from the 2002–05 surveys in the
former planned economies, which took place relatively early in the period of economic recovery. We then look at the results from
the BEEPS IV surveys, which we refer to as “2008”, that took place at the end of the recovery period and just prior to the global
economic crisis.
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4.3. Empirical strategy
In the estimation of Eq. (4) we want to control for firm characteristics such as size and international engagement. Thus for
each public input, k, we want to estimate
Rijk ¼ δ0k þ δ1kAj þ δ2kPLANj þ δ3k PLANj  Aj
 
þ XijΓk þ υijk ð11Þ
where Xij is a vector of firm characteristics and a corresponding parameter vector Γk. The primary motivation for controlling for
firm characteristics is that we do not want our comparisons across countries to be affected by differing sample compositions in
the surveys used or by the compositions of the populations of firms. The characteristics Xij are defined so that Xij=0 defines a
“benchmark firm”; for example, our benchmark firm is domestically-owned, and hence Xij includes a dummy variable FOij which
equals 1 when the firm is foreign-owned and equals 0 when it is domestically-owned. Because the benchmark firm is defined at
Xij=0, the predicted reported costs R^ in Eqs. (5) through (8) are unchanged. The effect is to define conditional means that can be
interpreted as the country means for a benchmark firm with a defined set of characteristics that is the same for every country.
These conditional means are the focus of our tests of legacy effects.
We use the following two-step estimation procedure. In the first step, we obtain estimates of the parameter vector Γk using
survey fixed effects. We estimate separately for planned and market economies so that the parameter vector Γk can vary for the
two groups of countries. The residuals and fixed effects are then used to construct estimates of the reported costsR˜ ijk with the firm
characteristics Xij partialled out. In the second step, estimates of R^LP;k, R^HP;k, R^LM;k and R^HM;k are obtained for each public input k by
regressing the partialled-out reported costs R˜ ijk on log GDP per capita interacted with the PLAN dummy as regressors and then
calculating the desired fitted values.11
The benchmark firm is privately owned and in manufacturing, by virtue of the construction of the datasets used. It has 30
employees, less than 10% foreign ownership, is exporting less than 10% of its sales, and is not a direct importer of inputs. The first
step thus estimates the following fixed-effects regression separately for planned and market economies:
Rijk ¼ γ1kN30ij þ γ2kFOij þ γ3kEXij þ γ4kIMij þ f jk þ εijk; ð12Þ
11 The advantage of this two-step procedure, besides computational simplicity, is robustness. Direct estimation of Eq. (11) would require the assumption that
the firm characteristics Xij are orthogonal to the full composite error term υijk, including the country-specific error uj. The fixed-effects first step in the procedure
we actually use assumes only that the firm characteristics are orthogonal to the idiosyncratic error εijk (see Appendix Table A3).
Table 4
Summary statistics, firm level survey data.
ALL Market Planned Of which: 2002–05 (BEEPS II & III) Of which: 2008 (BEEPS IV)
Country characteristics
Log GDP pc 8.43 8.32 9.00 8.87 9.17
GDP pc (exp(log)) 4580 4085 8106 7130 9563
Sample sizes
No. firms 62,032 51,677 10,355 5832 4523
No. countries 111 83 28 28 27
No. surveys 202 113 89 61 28
Firm characteristics
Log N 3.55 3.54 3.55 3.42 3.73
N (exp(log)) 34.7 34.6 34.9 30.4 41.6
foreign (1/0) 0.120 0.115 0.146 0.160 0.129
exporter (1/0) 0.291 0.281 0.342 0.335 0.350
importer (1/0) 0.249 0.232 0.331 0.330 0.334
small city (1/0) 0.675 0.672 0.691 0.661 0.729
Constraints (0–4)
Electricity 1.48 1.56 1.11 0.65 1.70
Telecoms 0.68 0.72 0.47 0.47 0.00
Transport 0.94 0.96 0.83 0.59 1.14
Access Land 0.85 0.84 0.88 0.67 1.14
Inad Educ Labor 1.22 1.18 1.41 1.09 1.82
Macro Instability 1.90 1.93 1.77 1.77 0.00
Gov Policy Unc 1.62 1.59 1.78 1.78 0.00
Political Instability 1.67 1.64 1.83 0.00 1.83
Tax Administration 1.42 1.39 1.59 1.62 1.56
Labour Reg 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.98 1.05
Customs 0.99 0.96 1.11 1.19 1.00
Bus Licensing 0.96 0.93 1.10 1.05 1.15
Courts 0.95 0.87 1.25 1.19 1.33
Corruption 1.57 1.59 1.49 1.29 1.72
Crime Theft Disorder 1.15 1.16 1.09 0.94 1.28
Notes: Means of GDP and N in levels are exp(mean(log(X)).
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where the variable N30 is log(N/30),12 fjk is the survey-specific fixed effect and the remaining variables are dummies
corresponding to the characteristics listed above. The benchmark reported cost of input k for firm i in country survey j from this
first-step estimation is simply:
R˜ijk ¼ f^ jk þ ε^ ijk:
R˜ijk is then used as the dependent variable in estimation by OLS of
R˜ijk ¼ δ0k þ δ1kAj þ δ2kPLANj þ δ3k PLANj  Aj
 
þ ζ ijk: ð13Þ
The estimated parameters from (13) and the reference income levels and country group definitions give us our statistics as
defined in Eqs. (5) through (10).
The statistical tests of how the reported costs for a single public input k differ across reference income levels and country groups
are conducted using Wald tests and the estimated parameters of Eq. (13); the covariance estimator used is robust to
heteroskedasticity. To test for whether, for a given country group and income level, the reported costs R^ of two constraints k and q
differ, we use the corresponding two estimations of Eq. (13) and perform a Wald test with a cluster- and heteroskedasticity-robust
covariance estimator that accounts for the possible within-firm correlation of the two error terms ζijk and ζijq.13
5. How salient were the legacies of communism for growth in the market economy?
In this section, we use the reported costs of the public input constraints as estimated using the methods set out in Section 4 to
answer the question of the continuing salience of the legacies of communism for the mainly small and medium-sized firms
covered in the business environment surveys. The aim is to test the hypothesis that differences in the burdens imposed on the
growth of firms by unreliable public inputs in planned and market economies can be linked to legacies of planning. The firm-level
data allow us to look separately at three elements of physical infrastructure (electricity, transport and telecommunications),
access to skilled labour, and a number of institutional inputs. This means we can see whether there is evidence of the impact on
firms of the greater endowments of physical infrastructure and education with which countries ended planning (relative to their
GDP per capita comparators) and the gaps in market institutions with which they entered transition to the market economy. We
undertake these comparisons both in 2002–05, after a decade of transition, and in 2008, on the eve of the global financial crisis.14
Though there are some small differences in the design of the earlier and later surveys, the latter offers us the opportunity to
observe whether the legacy effects of planning persisted through the period of strong growth.15
Table 5 summarises the predicted costs for the benchmark firm of different elements of the external environment at two different
levels of GDP per capita (low-income=$3500 and high-income=$16,500) in formerly planned and market economies. Entries in
bold italics signify a rating above the full sample mean of 1.1, while the other shaded cells in normal font signify those below.16
When we compare low-income formerly planned and market economies in 2002–05, legacy effects of planning are clear (first
column headed Diff L): in terms of their external environment, firms in low-income planned economies were poor in different
ways from firms in market economies. Firms in poor planned economies benefited from more satisfactory provision of physical
infrastructure, access to skilled labour, access to land, were less burdened by labour regulation and reported lower costs from
crime and theft than did firms in poor market economies. They reported more serious problems than poor market economies in
relation to a number of aspects of the institutional environment: tax administration, customs, business licensing and courts.
When comparing high-income planned andmarket economies in 2002–05, the differenceswere fewer (first columnheadedDiff H).
Electricity continued to pose fewer problems than was the case for firms in market economies but there was no difference with their
market economy comparators in relation to educated labour and the other aspects of physical infrastructure. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that countries that had undergone industrialisation as market economies had institutional legacies stretching back beyond
the planning era. The institution that stands out in this regard is labour regulation. Firms in richer planned economies rated problems
with labour regulation in a similar way to firms in richer market economies, namely as more serious than the average. This marks out
high-income planned andmarket economies fromboth sets of low-income countries. These results underline the initial hypothesis that
the two groups of planned economies are different. Planning accelerated the industrialisation of low-income countries, leaving them
12 Log(N/30)=log(N)− log(30), i.e., our size measure is constructed so that it takes the value zero for a firm with 30 employees.
13 The Stata command used to pool the estimates of Eq. (13) for each input k is suestwith clustering by firm. The results are equivalent to stacking the dataset by
public input, interacting the regressors in Eq. (13) with dummies for each input, estimating by OLS (so that the estimated coefficients are identical to those
obtained when estimating equation-by-equation) and using the cluster-robust covariance estimator for testing.
14 We use other questions in the survey to check whether the results of the 2007–09 round were contaminated by the early effects of the financial crisis.
Although in our analysis in this paper we do not use the questions on access to or cost of finance, we can use the answers to those questions to check for evidence
of the credit crunch. While the average complaint level across all dimensions of the business environment rises in 2008 compared to 2002–05, the 2008 complaint
level for problems related to finance remains similar to 2002–05. This evidence from the finance question suggests that the responses from 2008 should be
interpreted as “the eve of the financial crisis” rather than “early in the financial crisis”.
15 The main change was that the questions on government policy uncertainty and macroeconomic stability were dropped. A related question was asked instead
on political instability. The question about telecoms was also dropped for manufacturing firms. In short, the top- and bottom-ranked constraints were dropped.
16 In Table 5, we use a fairly high threshold for “significance”, i.e., we require the absolute value to be different from 0.1. This is a way of capturing both
“statistical significance” and “economic significance”. In Appendix Table A4, where the second stage results are reported, standard errors are shown in the usual
way with bold italics used to indicate the coefficients that are significantly different from zero.
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with features quite distinct from their market economy peers.17 However, it is clear that, as in poor planned economies, in rich ones,
firms were more troubled by burdens imposed by courts, tax administration and customs than was the case in market economies.
The results for 2008 suggest that the pressure of rapid growth was reflected in the evaluation of the external constraints firms
faced by firms in the formerly planned economies. As compared with the market economy sample (which pools all of the surveys
administered between 2002 and 2010) firms in planned economies in 2008 reported higher costs of constraints virtually across
the board (see the second Diff L and Diff H columns of Table 5). In both groups, the extent to which electricity was viewed as a
problem increased markedly in the 2008 survey.18
We can use the methodology developed in Section 4 to compare how public input constraints are ranked in the different country
groups. The purpose of comparing rankings rather than absolute ratings of the severity of constraints is to adjust for country differences in
the average reported severity: we look at whether particular constraints rank relatively high or relatively low for firms in the countries
concerned. The results are presented in Tables A5 and A6 in the appendix, for 2002–05 and 2008 respectively. There are some common
patterns in the ranking of constraints across all country groups. For example, in the light of the debate about the Washington and
post-Washington consensus, it is striking that macroeconomic stability and government policy uncertainty show up as the elements of
the external environment of most concern to firms in all country groups in 2002–05. Telecoms is bottom-ranked in each country group,
which may be a reflection of the extent to which telephony is now considered by firms to be a private rather than a public good.
The ranking exercise shows that in both groups of ex-planned economies, the three elements of physical infrastructure are at
the bottom. As might be expected in the light of the emphasis on education under planning, for the poor planned economies,
access to skilled labour is also low-ranked and not viewed as a major obstacle to growth. For both groups, the courts are ranked
high among institutional constraints.
Consistent with the results reported above, it is across the two groups of low-income countries where stark differences in the
ranking of constraints appear. Electricity is a serious problem for firms in market economies; the courts are not. The reverse is the
case for planned economies. Firms in higher-income planned economies ranked constraints in a more similar way to their
market-economy comparators than was the case in low-income planned economies. The main differences were that the courts
were ranked toward the top and access to skilled labour well down the list in planned economies whereas the reverse was the
case in market economies. The difficulties reported in relation to the courts in the richer planned economies suggest that although
17 Appendix Table A4 confirms the difference between the two groups of planned economies and their market economy peers highlighted in the Diff L and Diff H
columns of Table 5. If differences between planned and market economies were shared equally across the income distribution, the slopes of the P and M lines
would be equal and the slope dummy would be insignificant. As Table A4 shows, it is almost always significant.
18 Although there may be concern that the higher reported constraints in relation to electricity reflect the oil price spike in 2007 rather than the reliability of the
infrastructure, other evidence does not support this. For example, the correlation between power outages and electricity as a constraint is stronger in 2008 than in
previous years in the planned economies. Moreover, unlike in the planned economies, there is no increase in electricity complaints in 2008 in Turkey, which was also
surveyed in that year as part of the BEEPS IV survey, supporting the conclusion that this is a phenomenon specific to the formerly planned economies now in transition,
and not a reflection of changes in world energy prices. Additional support for the hypothesis that capacity and or access constraints rather than price effects dominate
comes from the fact that it is firms that expanded employment by more than 10% over the previous three years that complain more about electricity.
Table 5
Formerly planned economies (PE 2002–05; 2008) and market economies (ME).
Levels (> or b1.1) Differences (>0.1 or b−0.1)
PE 2002–05 PE 2008 ME PE 2002–05 vs. ME PE 2008 vs. ME
LP HP LP HP LM HM Diff L Diff H Diff L DIff H
Electricity 0.77* 0.55* 1.98* 1.55* 1.57* 0.71* −0.80* −0.16* 0.41* 0.85*
Telecoms 0.49* 0.44* n.a. n.a. 0.67* 0.42* −0.18* 0.02 n.a. n.a.
Transport 0.57* 0.58* 1.16 1.08 0.92* 0.54* −0.35* 0.04 0.24* 0.54*
AccessLand 0.70* 0.63* 1.25* 1.09 0.88* 0.41* −0.18* 0.22* 0.37* 0.68*
InadEducLabor 0.89* 1.15* 1.81* 1.67* 1.10 1.12 −0.21* 0.03 0.71* 0.55*
MacroInstability 1.76* 1.70* n.a. n.a. 1.86* 2.05* −0.09 −0.36* n.a. n.a.
GovPolicyUnc 1.76* 1.80* n.a. n.a. 1.57* 1.45* 0.18* 0.34* n.a. n.a.
PoliticalInstability n.a. n.a. 2.04* 1.72* 1.60* 1.85* n.a. n.a. 0.44* −0.13
TaxAdministration 1.64* 1.51* 1.44* 1.53* 1.34* 1.04* 0.30* 0.46* 0.10 0.49*
LaborReg 0.74* 1.16* 0.75* 1.09 0.90* 1.07* −0.16* 0.09 −0.15 0.02
Customs 1.08 0.80* 1.03 0.64* 0.74* 0.45* 0.35* 0.35* 0.30* 0.19*
BusLicensing 1.08 0.93* 1.14 1.11 0.88* 0.80* 0.20* 0.14 0.26* 0.31*
Courts 1.14* 1.24* 1.34* 1.27* 0.80* 0.77* 0.35* 0.47* 0.54* 0.50*
Corruption 1.39* 1.17* 1.94* 1.59* 1.52* 1.21* −0.14 −0.04 0.42* 0.38*
CrimeTheftDisorder 0.95* 0.96* 1.65* 1.16* 1.14* 0.97* −0.19* −0.02 0.51* 0.18*
Notes: This table reports tests of constraints across country groups: in the “Levels” columns, the tests are for each group on its own vs. the overall mean constraint
level of 1.1. In the “Differences columns”, the tests are vs. 0.1 if differences are positive and vs. −0.1 if they are negative.
Diff L=LP vs LM (low-income planned economies vs low-income market economies).
Diff H=HP vs HM (high-income planned economies vs high-income market economies).
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some institutions could be re-established relatively quickly, problems with the judicial system persisted. Overall, this suggests a
conclusion reminiscent of Tolstoy: rich countries resemble one another whether they underwent planning and transition or not;
poor countries are unhappy in their own different ways.
By the time of the 2008 survey, as reported in Tables A6a and A6b, priorities for firms had changed a great deal and the value of
inherited legacies appears to have eroded. In both poor and rich formerly planned economies, electricity moved from close to the
bottom to the top-ranked set of constraints. Problems with availability of skilled labour also emerged as serious in both groups of
countries, where it moved from well down the ranking to the top-ranked set in the high-income planned economies and the
second-ranked set in the low-income ones.
Plausible reasons for the emergence of electricity and skills as serious obstacles for firms in transition are on the one hand the
depreciation of the initial high endowments and inadequate investment during the phase of transition, and on the other, a greater
mismatch between endowments and the needs of firms in themarket economy in a phase of rapid growth. Our data donot allowus to
distinguish cleanly between the contributions of each of these. Since the formerly planned economies retained their advantage over
comparablemarket economies in the aggregate indicators of physical infrastructure capacity and education between the beginning of
transition and 2008 (Table 3), our results suggest that although the communist legacy brought with it comparatively high quantities
of these public inputs (measured at national level), qualitative aspects such as geographical distribution and orientation toward the
needs of highly vertically integrated production and distribution systems were increasingly revealed as ill-suited to the market
economy environment. An example that reflects the rigidity of the planning system was the orientation of the railway network to
service the needs of heavy industrial users and the haulage of rawmaterials. More generally, higher reported costs are likely to relate
to issues such as the flexibility of access to the grid; tariff structures; balance of transport modes and tariffs; and the value of the
existing mix of qualifications and skills. There are numerous descriptions in the literature of the mismatch between inherited
infrastructure and best practice arrangements in a market economy (e.g., EBRD, 1996, Carbajo and Fries, 1997, Aghion and
Schankerman, 1999, von Hirschhausen, 2002, Feinberg andMeurs, 2008). The firm-level data suggest that the predicted mismatches
did not emerge as constraints on firms until the end of the second decade of transition.
6. Conclusion
We suggested at the outset that an evaluation of the legacy of central planning was likely to involve a trade-off between the
adverse effects of static allocative inefficiency and poor incentives for innovation, and the beneficial effects of provision of greater
quantities of physical infrastructure and human capital thanwas typical of market economies.We have shown that the overall terms
of this trade-off depended to a striking extent on countries' initial levels of development. Planning appears not to have hampered the
development of initially poor countries. Indeed, there is evidence that for initially poor countries, the long-run benefits of physical
infrastructure and human capital substantially outweighed the long-run economic costs of static inefficiencies and weak innovation
incentives. Furthermore, countries that were still poor at the end of the central planning era were quite different from other poor
countries, and appeared to benefit in the market economy from the legacy effects of their infrastructure and human capital
endowments. However, their ability to take advantage of the opportunities of the market economy was limited by obstacles such as
poor courts and tax administration, which had not been a handicap under central planning but were so to a high degree afterwards.
The more prosperous adopters of planning ended up certainly no better off and (under most though not all comparisons)
substantially worse off than their pre-planning peers. Countries that were already comparatively prosperous before the
imposition of central planning appear to have benefited less from the infrastructure and human capital advantages of planning,
and suffered more from the costs of losing market incentives.
To uncover evidence on the hypothesized channels from the initial level of development to how countries fared under
planning, we turned to the transition years and legacy effects. We analysed firm-level data reporting how various aspects of their
business environment affected the opportunity for firms to grow. In 2002–05, after more than a decade of transition, firms in rich
formerly planned economies were found to benefit less from infrastructure and education advantages over their market economy
peers than do those in poor planned economies, and to be hampered by weaknesses in market institutions different from those
that are most problematic in market economies. Overall, though, rich formerly planned economies differ less from their market
economy counterparts than do poor planned economies, which continue to have strengths and to face handicaps that are quite
unlike those of poor countries that never went through the central planning process.
Finally, we tested whether the legacy effects of Soviet planning, which persist in the aggregate data on infrastructure and
education in 2008, continue to reflect the evaluation by firms of their external environment in the years of strong growth running
up to the global financial crisis. We found that they do not. In the 2008 survey, firms in formerly planned economies report higher
costs of their external business environment than do market economy firms. Most striking is the disappearance of the advantage
of low-income planned economies in electricity and education. In poor and rich formerly planned economies, electricity and
education are rated as more costly to the firm than is the case for market economies, and both are highly ranked as compared with
other aspects of the external environment. Taken together with the results of the 2002–2005 surveys, this suggests that the initial
advantages of planned economies in terms of the quantity of prior investments in infrastructure and human capital masked
quality handicaps which caught up with these countries as growth went ahead. A year of education and a kilometre of railway
track in a planned economy were simply less productive than a year of education and a kilometre of track in a market economy,
and the fact that formerly planned economies began transition with higher quantities of both was not enough to protect them
from the consequences of these quality handicaps.
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Appendix A
A.1. Country data notes for Section 2 and Tables 1a, 1b and 2
GDP per capita in 1988 and 2005 is at PPP in 2005 $US from World Bank WDI, except as noted.
GDP per capita in 1913 and 1937 is from Maddison in 1990 $US, converted to 2005 $US using US GDP in 1990 from Maddison
(in $1990) and World Bank WDI (in $2005), except as noted.
Broadberry and Klein (2008) is used for GDP per capita in 1913 in Russia and 1937 in Romania, the latter in preference to
Maddison because of the postwar territorial change associated with the separation of Moldova from Romania (Broadberry-Klein
refer to the prewar territory of Romania).
1913 proxies and estimates:
Ukraine, Belarus: proxy is Russia.
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia: proxy is Turkey.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan: proxy is India.
Uzbekistan: proxy is Iran/Iraq.
Bangladesh, Pakistan: proxy is India.
Uzbekistan was more urbanized than the rest of Central Asia in 1926. Hence we proxy Uzbek GDP using Iran rather than India.
Source: Henze (1949).
1937 proxies and estimates:
Estonia, Latvia: proxy is Finland.
Lithuania: proxy is Poland.
Moldova and Romania: the Broadberry and Klein (2008) estimate for Romania in 1937 is used for both Romania and Moldova.
Czech Republic, Slovakia: Czechoslovakia and Capek and Sazama (1993); see below.
Yugoslav republics: Yugoslavia 1937 and 1953 republic data; see below.
Ecuador and Paraguay is 1939 GDP per capita.
Jamaica is 1938 GDP per capita.
Myanmar is average of 1936 and 1938 GDP per capita.
“The prewar development levels of Estonia and Finland were nearly equal, and by 1939, the Estonian standard of living was
approximately on par with - if not slightly higher than - that of Finland, and Latvia was not far behind.” Source: Hedegaard and
Lindström (1998: 15).
Yugoslav republic GDP per capita 1937 is based on Yugoslavia 1937 from Maddison and 1953 relative social product per head
in the separate republics in current prices. Source: Gregory (1973).
Czech and Slovak GDP per capita 1937 is based on Czechoslovakia 1937 fromMaddison and 1937 relative shares of income and
population from Capek and Sazama (1993).
1988 and 2008 estimates:
The main source is the World Bank WDI PPP data in 2005 $US. In several cases, 1988 and 2008 figures use as a supplementary
source the Conference Board “Total Economy Database” (TED). TED provides two PPP series, one in 2010 “EKS” $US and one in
1990 “GK” $US. The latter is compatible with Maddison's PPP series. TED data below refer to the EKS series except where noted.
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia: WB figure for 1990 backwards
chain-linked from TED to obtain 1989; 1988 is set=1989.
Azerbaijan: 1988 based on 1989 WB figure backwards chain-linked from TED.
Russia: 1988=1989.
Taiwan, Iraq, Serbia & Montenegro, Bosnia & Herzegovina: TED data converted to 2005 dollars using US 2005 GDP per capita
from WB in 2005 $US and TED in 2010 $US.
Serbia & Montenegro: 1988=1989.
Bosnia: 1988 and 1989=1990.
Poland: WB figure for 1990 backwards chain-linked from TED to obtain 1988.
Myanmar: from TED GK series in 1990 $US converted to 2005 $US using US 1990 GDP per capita fromWB in 2005 $US and TED
GK data in 1990 $US.
A.2. Deriving the estimating equation for Section 4:
Denoting a maximum-value function by a superscript *, we have (from Eq. (3)):
Nij ¼ N Aij; Bj;wj
 
ðA1Þ
πij ¼ π Aij; Bj;wj
 
¼ AijF Nij; Bj
 
−wjN

ij: ðA2Þ
Our aim is to compare the impact of a public input on firm performance in different countries or types of countries without the
need to measure Bj. We refer to the firms' responses to the business environment questions (the ranking from “no obstacle” to
“very severe obstacle”) as the firm's “reported cost” Rij of a public input. We interpret it as the gap between the firm's profit in the
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hypothetical situation where the public input provided is of sufficient quality that it poses a negligible obstacle to the firm's
operations and growth, and the firm's profit in reality, given the actual quality of public input provided.
If we denote the level of public input provided in an ideal, high-quality business environment as B j, we have
Rij ¼ π Aij;B j;wj
 
−π Aij;Bj;wj
 
: ðA4Þ
The marginal analogue of the reported cost Rij for small changes in the public input is therefore simply the derivative of the
profit function:
Rij≈
∂πij
∂Bj
≡ λij: ðA5Þ
By the envelope theorem for constrainedmaximization, the derivative of the profit function πij∗ with respect to a constrained or
fixed input is simply the shadow price of the input λij. For this reason, Carlin et al. (2006) suggest we can interpret the responses
to “Subjective Severity” questions as the shadow prices of shortcomings in the public input Bj: Two straightforward results are
that the shadow price of Bj is decreasing in Bj:
∂λij
∂Bj
≡
∂2πij
∂B2j
b0 ðA6Þ
and is increasing in the productivity of the firm:
∂λij
∂Aij
≡
∂2πij
∂Bj∂Aij
> 0 ðA7Þ
i.e., a higher productivity firm will report higher costs of a poor public input than a lower productivity firm – even though they
share the same business environment.
The first step in taking the model to the data is simply to linearise and add an error term ηij:
Rij ¼ α0 þ α1Aij þ α2Bj þ ηij; ðA8Þ
where we expect that α1>0 and α2b0. Since our focus in this paper is variation across countries rather than across firms within
countries,19 we say that firm productivity is randomly distributed around a country-specific mean:
Aij ¼ Aj þ eij: ðA9Þ
Mean productivity Āj is also a proxy for a country's level of development or income per capita, and we expect provision of
public inputs to vary systematically with income as we saw using aggregate proxy indicators for public inputs presented in Figs. 2
and 3. We use a simple linear formulation for the country provision of public input Bj:
Bj ¼ β0 þ β1Aj þ uj; ðA10Þ
where uj is a country-level error term.
Substituting Eqs. (A9) and (A10) into (A8), the equation for reported cost Rij, we obtain
Rij ¼ δ0 þ δ1Aj þ υij ðA11Þ
where
δ0 ≡ α0 þ α2β0 ðA12Þ
δ1 ≡ α1 þ α2β1 ðA13Þ
and υij is a composite error term:
υij ≡ ηij þ α1eij þ α2uj: ðA14Þ
The slope of the relationship in (A11) will be positive or negative depending on the values of the parameters α1, α2 and β1. For
example, if public input provision increases quickly enough with income (large β1) and/or the shadow price of the input falls
quickly as provision improves (large α2), both relative to how quickly the shadow price of the input increases with firm
productivity (α1), the income-reported cost relationship will be downward sloping.
Eq. (A11) can be implemented empirically by using GDP per capita for Āj. The dependent variable is the Rij for a particular
public input reported by firm i in country j. The resulting parameter estimates can be used together with a chosen reference level
of income for Āref to obtain a predicted value R^ref . The interpretation of R^ref is that it is the reported cost or shadow price we would
predict for a typical firm in a country with income Āref. This predicted value is a statistic, and hence we can use it in hypothesis
testing or to construct confidence intervals.
19 See Carlin et al. (2006, 2010) for applications of this framework that explore the relationship between Rij and firm productivity.
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This approach allows us to compare the impact of a public input on firm performance in different countries or types of
countries without the need to measure Bj . We augment the public input provision Eq. (A10) with planned-economy slope and
intercept dummies, estimating separately for each public input k:
Bj ¼ β0k þ β1kAj þ β2kPLANj þ β3k PLANj  Aj
 
þ ujk ðA15Þ
and then to obtain a feasible estimating equation in observables, we substitute Eqs. (A9) and (A15) into Eq. (A8) and get our basic
reported cost estimating equation:
Rijk ¼ δ0k þ δ1kAj þ δ2kPLANj þ δ3k PLANj  Aj
 
þ υijk ðA16Þ
where δ0k, δ1k and υijk are defined as earlier, and
δ2k ≡ α2kβ2k ðA17Þ
δ3k ≡ α2kβ3k: ðA18Þ
It is important to note that the parameters β0 and β1 relating country income to public infrastructure provision in Eqs. (A10)
and (A15) need not have a structural interpretation.20 Rather, country income is being used here as a control, and the predicted
reported costs R^ obtained from the estimation of Eq. (A16) should be interpreted simply as estimates conditional on country
income. Instead of working with parameters β2k and β3k, we work with the parameters scaled by α2k.
20 For example, we expect income to affect infrastructure provision – richer countries can afford more – but we also expect infrastructure provision to affect
income – more infrastructure raises country income.
Table A1
Components of aggregate business environment indicators.
World Bank Governance World Bank Doing Business Heritage Foundation
Economic Freedom
Fraser Institute Economic Freedom
Broad dimensions of
governance or
institutional quality
Business regulation and the
protection of property rights
Measures how free individuals
are to “work, produce, consume
and invest … both protected by
the state and unconstrained by
the state”
Measures “the extent to which
rightly acquired property is
protected and individuals engage
in voluntary transactions”
Voice & accountability Starting a business Business #1 Size of Government #1
Political stability Dealing with construction permits Trade #2 Private Property & the Rule of Law #2
Government effectiveness Registering a property Fiscal #3 Soundness of Money #3
Regulatory quality Getting credit Government Spending #4 Trade Regulation & Tariffs #4
Rule of law Protecting investors Monetary #5 Regulation subcomponents 2008:
Control of corruption Paying taxes Investment #6 Labour Market Regulation #5
Trading across borders Property Rights #7 Business Regulation #6, of which
Enforcing contracts Corruption #8 Extra payments/bribes
Closing a business Labour #9 Licensing restrictions
Tax compliance
Sources of data and methodology (descriptions as provided by the data publishers)
The indicators rely exclusively on
perceptions-based data sources,
which are surveys of households &
firms, subjective assessments of
experts from a variety of commercial
business information providers,
NGOs, public sector bodies, and
country analysts in multilateral
organizations.
“Expert assessment”: The survey
uses a simple business case to ensure
comparability across economies and
over time—with assumptions about the
legal form of the business, its size, its
location and the nature of its
operations. Surveys are administered
through more than 8200 local experts,
including lawyers, business
consultants, accountants, freight
forwarders, government officials
and other professionals routinely
administering or advising on legal
and regulatory requirements.
#1 WB Doing Business data plus
other expert publications
#2 Index based on trade-weighted
average tariff rate and non-tariff
barriers
#3 Index based on top tax rate on
individual income, corporate
income, and tax revenue as % GDP
#4 Government expenditure
including transfers as % GDP
#5 Index based on recent inflation
and existence of price controls
#6 Index based on treatment of
foreign investment, expropriation,
forex and capital controls
#7, #8 Assessment from expert
publications
#9 Quantitative indicators
including minimum wage, hiring,
firing regulations
#1 Index based on government
consumption as share of total
consumption, transfers & subsidies as
% GDP, SOEs, top marginal \tax rate
#2 Expert judgement on judicial
independence, court impartiality,
protection of property rights etc.
Sources include WB Governance
indicators and Doing Business
#3 Index based on money growth,
inflation
#4 Index based on trade tax revenues,
tariff rates, non-tariff barriers,
Doing Business time cost to export and
import, etc.
#5 Index based on hiring & firing, and
hours regulations, cost of dismissal
#6 Index based e.g. on WEF question
on administrative burdens and Doing
Business questions on starting a
business.
Kaufmann et al. (2010)
www.govindicators.org
www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/
methodology-note
www.heritage.org/index/pdf/
2011_Methodology.pdf
www.freetheworld.com/2011/
reports/world/EFW2011_appendix.pdf
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Table A2
Enterprise survey data – country coverage by year.
The table below lists the number of firms in the sample by group (planned economy or market economy), country and year. All data was obtained from theWorld
Bank's Enterprise Surveys website, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Planned economies
Albania 60 71 110 241
Armenia 54 217 112 383
Azerbaijan 35 185 111 331
Belarus 32 52 74 158
Bosnia and Herzegovina 56 64 118 238
Bulgaria 44 324 53 538 95 1054
Croatia 29 62 338 429
Czech Republic 63 78 84 225
Estonia 29 39 90 158
Georgia 30 47 117 194
Hungary 51 352 103 506
Kazakhstan 41 334 179 554
Kyrgyz Republic 42 102 53 91 288
Latvia 28 33 89 150
Lithuania 35 157 41 97 330
Macedonia, FYR 41 55 114 210
Moldova 42 103 198 107 450
Montenegro 42 37 79
Poland 97 105 514 149 865
Romania 70 373 184 627
Russian Federation 111 137 585 833
Serbia 101 129 230
Serbia and Montenegro 58 63 121
Slovak Republic 25 32 81 138
Slovenia 45 55 101 201
Tajikistan 34 96 50 113 293
Ukraine 121 164 463 748
Uzbekistan 44 100 63 114 321
Total PEs 1317 649 481 3385 986 881 2656 10,355
Market economies
Afghanistan 121 121
Algeria 367 367
Angola 214 214
Argentina 1387 1387
Bangladesh 970 1196 2166
Benin 144 144
Bolivia 770 770
Botswana 113 113
Brazil 1619 902 2521
Burkina Faso 51 93 144
Burundi 101 101
Cambodia 62 62
Cameroon 119 116 235
Cape Verde 47 47
Chile 677 1331 2008
China 771 907 1678
Colombia 1283 1283
Congo, Dem. Rep. 149 149
Costa Rica 338 338
Cote d'Ivoire 169 169
Dominican Republic 110 110
Ecuador 431 752 1183
Egypt, Arab Rep. 956 956
El Salvador 464 904 1368
Eritrea 57 57
Ethiopia 303 303
Fiji 48 48
Gambia, The 32 32
Germany 214 214
Ghana 290 290
Greece 98 98
Guatemala 435 641 1076
Guinea 134 134
Guinea-Bissau 49 49
Guyana 152 152
(continued on next page)
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Table A2 (continued)
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Honduras 446 523 969
India 1716 2043 3759
Indonesia 680 1165 1845
Ireland 175 175
Jamaica 67 67
Jordan 350 350
Kenya 226 392 618
Korea, Rep. 215 215
Lao PDR 5 5
Lebanon 161 161
Lesotho 55 55
Madagascar 277 203 480
Malawi 151 151
Malaysia 140 140
Mali 70 300 370
Mauritania 80 80
Mauritius 164 143 307
Mexico 2277 2277
Mongolia 185 131 316
Morocco 828 828
Mozambique 341 341
Namibia 104 104
Nepal 137 137
Nicaragua 440 707 1147
Niger 122 122
Nigeria 947 947
Oman 97 97
Pakistan 895 895
Panama 552 552
Paraguay 808 808
Peru 119 721 840
Philippines 616 951 1567
Portugal 131 131
Rwanda 57 57
Senegal 140 259 399
South Africa 571 679 1250
Spain 134 134
Sri Lanka 367 367
Swaziland 70 70
Syrian Arab Republic 537 537
Tanzania 165 267 432
Thailand 1381 1381
Turkey 133 155 1271 847 2406
Uganda 134 306 440
Uruguay 756 756
Vietnam 1137 748 1885
Yemen, Rep. 239 239
Zambia 83 298 381
Total MEs 5554 8095 4845 4604 17,864 4702 968 4806 239 51,677
GRAND TOTAL 6871 8744 5326 7989 17,864 5688 1849 7462 239 62,032
24 W. Carlin et al. / Explorations in Economic History xxx (2012) xxx–xxx
Please cite this article as: Carlin, W., et al., Soviet power plus electrification: What is the long-run legacy of communism?
Explor. Econ. Hist. (2012), doi:10.1016/j.eeh.2012.07.003
Table A3
Partialling-out regressions.
The table below reports the basic results for the first-step fixed effects estimates of Eq. (12). Fixed effects correspond to country surveys. Each public input is
estimated separately for market economies (ME), planned economies (PE) for the period 2002–05 (BEEPS II & III), and planned economies for 2008 (BEEPS IV).
Standard errors are in parentheses; they are reported for information only and are not used for the tests in the paper. Bold and italic indicates significant at the 5%
level. The constant column reports the estimated mean fixed effect.
Constraint Country group log(N) foreign exporter importer constant N (obs) N (surveys)
Access Land ME −0.0440 −0.0766 0.0114 0.0954 0.8310 49,018 111
(0.0045) (0.0182) (0.0135) (0.0147) (0.0070)
PE 2002–05 −0.0414 0.0992 −0.0292 −0.0091 0.6688 5386 61
(0.0099) (0.0399) (0.0341) (0.0344) (0.0196)
PE 2008 −0.0354 −0.0991 −0.0857 0.1461 1.1486 4149 28
(0.0174) (0.0670) (0.0520) (0.0505) (0.0296)
Bus Licensing ME 0.0047 −0.0347 0.0077 0.2527 0.8707 49,170 110
(0.0044) (0.0176) (0.0131) (0.0144) (0.0068)
PE 2002–05 −0.0027 0.0866 0.0175 0.0608 1.0140 5577 61
(0.0106) (0.0425) (0.0363) (0.0368) (0.0209)
PE 2008 0.0206 0.0416 0.0107 0.0455 1.1187 4226 28
(0.0152) (0.0589) (0.0459) (0.0447) (0.0259)
Corruption ME −0.0261 −0.0729 0.0029 0.4607 1.4917 49,490 111
(0.0055) (0.0220) (0.0163) (0.0178) (0.0085)
PE 2002–05 −0.0060 −0.0165 −0.0347 0.0638 1.2853 5108 60
(0.0117) (0.0470) (0.0406) (0.0402) (0.0233)
PE 2008 −0.0229 −0.0693 0.0089 0.0532 1.7155 4246 28
(0.0172) (0.0674) (0.0519) (0.0507) (0.0295)
Courts ME 0.0366 −0.0296 0.0097 0.3036 0.7924 39,360 95
(0.0049) (0.0195) (0.0145) (0.0151) (0.0077)
PE 2002–05 0.0427 0.0073 −0.0928 0.0695 1.1892 5352 61
(0.0110) (0.0442) (0.0376) (0.0382) (0.0217)
PE 2008 0.0169 0.0270 0.0032 0.0865 1.2939 4096 28
(0.0164) (0.0641) (0.0493) (0.0482) (0.0284)
Crime Theft Disorder ME −0.0032 −0.0394 −0.0568 0.2593 1.1212 48,019 108
(0.0048) (0.0190) (0.0142) (0.0156) (0.0074)
PE 2002–05 −0.0283 −0.0132 −0.0423 0.0203 0.9505 5521 61
(0.0102) (0.0412) (0.0351) (0.0358) (0.0202)
PE 2008 −0.0118 −0.1070 −0.0625 −0.0431 1.3317 4407 28
(0.0159) (0.0620) (0.0481) (0.0469) (0.0271)
Customs ME 0.0516 0.0887 0.2031 0.6873 0.7107 46,453 110
(0.0045) (0.0176) (0.0132) (0.0143) (0.0071)
PE 2002–05 0.0386 0.1272 0.2779 0.3171 0.9504 5306 61
(0.0109) (0.0430) (0.0368) (0.0373) (0.0219)
PE 2008 0.0137 0.0969 0.1932 0.3608 0.7666 3923 28
(0.0157) (0.0596) (0.0459) (0.0447) (0.0280)
Electricity ME −0.0114 −0.0188 0.0187 0.3166 1.4811 50,166 111
(0.0052) (0.0209) (0.0155) (0.0169) (0.0080)
PE 2002–05 −0.0074 −0.0064 −0.0129 −0.0502 0.6683 5798 61
(0.0090) (0.0363) (0.0309) (0.0314) (0.0177)
PE 2008 0.0140 −0.1087 −0.0614 0.0793 1.7045 4489 28
(0.0187) (0.0731) (0.0567) (0.0554) (0.0318)
Gov Policy Unc ME 0.0470 −0.0090 −0.0144 0.0760 1.5636 25,936 62
(0.0065) (0.0271) (0.0192) (0.0233) (0.0103)
PE 2002–05 0.0211 −0.0590 −0.0038 0.0449 1.7747 5667 61
(0.0104) (0.0417) (0.0354) (0.0362) (0.0204)
Inad Educ Labor ME 0.0374 −0.1078 0.0072 0.3686 1.1018 49,986 111
(0.0046) (0.0186) (0.0137) (0.0150) (0.0071)
PE 2002–05 0.0230 0.0441 0.1156 0.0840 1.0131 5706 61
(0.0103) (0.0415) (0.0353) (0.0360) (0.0203)
PE 2008 0.0598 −0.0514 0.1491 0.0945 1.7181 4438 28
(0.0157) (0.0613) (0.0476) (0.0465) (0.0268)
Labor Reg ME 0.0532 −0.0648 0.0540 0.2673 0.9213 49,603 110
(0.0043) (0.0174) (0.0129) (0.0141) (0.0067)
PE 2002–05 0.0445 0.0087 0.0934 0.0234 0.9396 5653 61
(0.0096) (0.0387) (0.0329) (0.0335) (0.0190)
PE 2008 0.0475 −0.0285 0.1197 0.0940 0.9678 4475 28
(0.0134) (0.0524) (0.0406) (0.0398) (0.0228)
Macro Instability ME 0.0388 −0.0565 0.1077 0.0612 1.8746 31,781 85
(0.0063) (0.0248) (0.0182) (0.0199) (0.0100)
PE 2002–05 0.0268 −0.0144 0.0782 0.0355 1.7325 5674 61
(0.0104) (0.0418) (0.0356) (0.0363) (0.0205)
Political Instability ME 0.0108 −0.0413 0.0861 0.0591 1.6045 18,473 51
(0.0078) (0.0303) (0.0237) (0.0227) (0.0121)
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Table A3 (continued)
Constraint Country group log(N) foreign exporter importer constant N (obs) N (surveys)
PE 2008 0.0197 −0.0754 0.0698 −0.0866 1.8372 4328 28
(0.0169) (0.0663) (0.0511) (0.0499) (0.0290)
Tax Administration ME 0.0009 −0.0613 0.0040 0.3462 1.3101 49,611 110
(0.0048) (0.0193) (0.0143) (0.0157) (0.0074)
PE 2002–05 −0.0123 0.0200 0.0291 0.0793 1.5784 5690 61
(0.0106) (0.0426) (0.0363) (0.0370) (0.0208)
PE 2008 0.0096 −0.0013 0.1112 0.0409 1.4997 4464 28
(0.0151) (0.0590) (0.0459) (0.0448) (0.0258)
Telecoms ME 0.0273 0.0952 0.0519 0.0239 0.6822 30,617 85
(0.0052) (0.0205) (0.0155) (0.0173) (0.0081)
PE 2002–05 −0.0133 0.0097 0.0157 −0.0057 0.4668 5728 61
(0.0079) (0.0318) (0.0272) (0.0276) (0.0156)
Transport ME 0.0243 0.0242 0.0111 0.2951 0.8803 49,680 110
(0.0044) (0.0177) (0.0131) (0.0143) (0.0068)
PE 2002–05 0.0079 0.0722 0.0015 0.0119 0.5706 5772 61
(0.0087) (0.0350) (0.0299) (0.0303) (0.0171)
PE 2008 0.0368 0.0644 −0.0313 0.0749 1.1078 4448 28
(0.0161) (0.0628) (0.0487) (0.0476) (0.0274)
Table A4
Second-step estimations.
This table reports the results for the second-step estimates of Eq. (13). Each public input is estimated twice, first pooling market economies with planned
economies for the period 2002–05 (BEEPS II & III), and second pooling the same sample for 2008 (BEEPS IV). Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are in
parentheses. Cross-equation tests are based on pooling these separate estimations using the Stata command suest, clustering on firm, and are not reported here.
Bold and italic indicates significant at the 5% level. GDP per capita Āj is centred at the ln($7500), the middle of the PE range for the period and sample of countries
we have. The constant column can be interpreted as the estimated mean reported cost of input k for a ME with this level of income, and the coefficient on the
dummy variable PLANj is an estimate of the difference between reported costs in a planned economy compared to a market economy, holding income constant at
this level.
Low income Low income High income High income
intercept PE intercept PE log(GDP) log(GDP)*PE
Constraint Comparison δ0 δ2 δ0 δ2 δ1 δ3 N obs N countries
Access Land ME vs. PE 2002–05 0.879 −0.177 0.412 0.217 −0.302 0.255 54,404 110
(0.006) (0.019) (0.010) (0.022) (0.077) (0.099)
ME vs. PE 2008 0.374 0.681 0.198 53,167 109
(0.044) (0.031) (0.198)
Bus Licensing ME vs. PE 2002–05 0.879 0.204 0.797 0.137 −0.053 −0.043 54,747 110
(0.006) (0.021) (0.010) (0.024) (0.080) (0.112)
ME vs. PE 2008 0.263 0.309 0.029 53,396 109
(0.036) (0.027) (0.128)
Corruption ME vs. PE 2002–05 1.524 −0.135 1.206 −0.040 −0.205 0.061 54,598 110
(0.007) (0.025) (0.013) (0.027) (0.108) (0.154)
ME vs. PE 2008 0.418 0.388 −0.020 53,736 109
(0.047) (0.032) (0.210)
Courts ME vs. PE 2002–05 0.797 0.346 0.771 0.469 −0.017 0.080 44,712 100
(0.007) (0.022) (0.011) (0.026) (0.091) (0.155)
ME vs. PE 2008 0.538 0.502 −0.023 43,456 99
(0.043) (0.029) (0.145)
Crime, Theft, Disord ME vs. PE 2002–05 1.137 −0.192 0.975 −0.018 −0.105 0.112 53,540 107
(0.006) (0.021) (0.011) (0.025) (0.087) (0.149)
ME vs. PE 2008 0.513 0.185 −0.211 52,426 106
(0.044) (0.028) (0.160)
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A.2.1. Tables A5 and A6. Ranking of constraints
Tables A5 and A6 present the analysis of the ranking of constraints for each country group based on the tests of the differences
between the reported costs of constraints. The diagonals show the estimated ⌢δ3k in Eq. (13) for obstacle k in a particular country
group. The row/column off-diagonals report the results of testing whether, for a given country group, the estimated ⌢δ3k for the
row obstacle k is significantly different from the ⌢δ3q estimated for the column obstacle q. To facilitate comparison of ranks across
the country groups, we have used italic font for the physical infrastructure elements (shaded blue), under-lined access to skilled
labour (yellow), macroeconomic constraints are bold (pink) and institutions are in normal font (white) (with courts in bold
(grey)). Based on the tests of differences, the constraints can be grouped into 5–7 sets according to their reported severity. The
sets are shown by the bold boxes.
Table A4 (continued)
Low income Low income High income High income
intercept PE intercept PE log(GDP) log(GDP)*PE
Constraint Comparison δ0 δ2 δ0 δ2 δ1 δ3 N obs N countries
Customs ME vs. PE 2002–05 0.738 0.345 0.448 0.351 −0.187 0.004 51,759 110
(0.006) (0.022) (0.010) (0.024) (0.069) (0.107)
ME vs. PE 2008 0.291 0.181 −0.071 50,376 109
(0.041) (0.027) (0.121)
Electricity ME vs. PE 2002–05 1.567 −0.798 0.708 −0.158 −0.554 0.413 55,964 110
(0.007) (0.020) (0.012) (0.022) (0.075) (0.112)
ME vs. PE 2008 0.414 0.846 0.279 54,655 109
(0.045) (0.034) (0.161)
Gov Policy Unc ME vs. PE 2002–05 1.574 0.182 1.455 0.342 −0.077 0.103 31,603 79
(0.009) (0.022) (0.017) (0.028) (0.156) (0.193)
ME vs. PE 2008 n.a. n.a.
Inad Educ Labor ME vs. PE 2002–05 1.100 −0.206 1.120 0.030 0.013 0.152 55,692 110
(0.006) (0.019) (0.011) (0.024) (0.082) (0.104)
ME vs. PE 2008 0.705 0.551 −0.099 54,424 109
(0.040) (0.029) (0.159)
Labor Reg ME vs. PE 2002–05 0.904 −0.164 1.071 0.093 0.108 0.166 55,256 110
(0.005) (0.017) (0.011) (0.024) (0.094) (0.127)
ME vs. PE 2008 −0.155 0.016 0.110 54,078 109
(0.031) (0.025) (0.121)
Macro Instability ME vs. PE 2002–05 1.856 −0.092 2.052 −0.356 0.127 −0.170 37,455 100
(0.008) (0.022) (0.015) (0.027) (0.114) (0.155)
ME vs. PE 2008 n.a. n.a.
Political Instability ME vs. PE 2002–05 n.a. n.a.
ME vs. PE 2008 1.596 0.449 1.847 −0.120 0.162 −0.367 22,801 78
(0.011) (0.047) (0.020) (0.036) (0.168) (0.262)
Tax Administration ME vs. PE 2002–05 1.340 0.300 1.044 0.463 −0.190 0.105 55,301 110
(0.006) (0.021) (0.012) (0.026) (0.111) (0.151)
ME vs. PE 2008 0.101 0.487 0.249 54,075 109
(0.038) (0.028) (0.147)
Telecoms ME vs. PE 2002–05 0.672 −0.180 0.418 0.020 −0.163 0.129 36,345 99
(0.006) (0.016) (0.012) (0.020) (0.047) (0.067)
ME vs. PE 2008 n.a. n.a.
Transport ME vs. PE 2002–05 0.918 −0.352 0.538 0.038 −0.245 0.251 55,452 109
(0.006) (0.017) (0.010) (0.020) (0.050) (0.070)
ME vs. PE 2008 0.239 0.543 0.196 54,128 108
(0.039) (0.028) (0.112)
Notes:
Coefficients are obtained from estimation of Eq. (13) in the main text.
Intercepts and SEs for “ME vs. PE 2008” are identical to “ME vs. PE 2002–05” and hence are not shown.
SEs for intercepts and PE dummies are robust to heteroskedasticity.
SEs for GDP terms are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on country.
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Table A5a
Ranking constraints: Low income formerly planned economies (2002–05) and market economies.
Planned; Low-income 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
MacroInst GovPolicy TaxAdmin Corruption Courts Customs BusLicens CrimeThef InadEducL Electricity LaborReg AccessLand Transport Telecoms
1 Macro Instability 1.76
2 Gov Policy Uncertainty 1.76
3 Tax Administration 1.64
4 Corruption ** ** ** 1.39
5 Courts ** ** ** ** 1.14
6 Customs ** ** ** ** 1.08
7  Bus Licensing ** ** ** ** 1.08
8  Crime Theft Disorder ** ** ** ** ** 0.95
9  Inad Educ Labor ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.89
10  Electricity ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.77
11  Labor Regulation ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.74
12  Access Land ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.70
13  Transport ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.57
14  Telecoms ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.49
Market; Low-income 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
MacroInst GovPolicy Electricity Corruption TaxAdmin CrimeTheft InadEducL Transport LaborReg AccessLand BusLicensingCourts Customs Telecoms
1 MacroInstability 1.86
2 GovPolicyUnc ** 1.57
3 Electricity ** 1.57
4 Corruption ** 1.52
5 TaxAdministration ** ** ** ** 1.34
6 CrimeTheftDisorder ** ** ** ** ** 1.14
7  InadEducLabor ** ** ** ** ** 1.10
8  Transport ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.92
9  LaborReg ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.90
10  AccessLand ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.88
11  BusLicensing ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.88
12  Courts ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.80
13  Customs ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.74
14  Telecoms ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.67
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Table A5b
Ranking constraints: High income formerly planned economies (2002–5) and market economies.
Planned; High-income 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
GovPolicy MacroInst TaxAdmin Courts Corruption LaborReg InadEducL CrimeTheft BusLicens Customs AccessLand Transport Electricity Telecoms
1 Gov Policy Uncertainty 1.80
2 Macro Instability 1.70
3 TaxAdministration ** ** 1.51
4 Courts ** ** ** 1.24
5 Corruption ** ** ** 1.17
6 LaborReg ** ** ** 1.16
7  InadEducLabor ** ** ** 1.15
8  CrimeTheftDisorder ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.96
9  BusLicensing ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.93
10  Customs ** ** ** ** ** ** ** * 0.80
11  AccessLand ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.63
12  Transport ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.58
13  Electricity ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.55
14  Telecoms ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** * 0.44
Market; High-income 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
MacroInst GovPolicy Corruption InadEducL LaborReg TaxAdmin CrimeTheft BusLicens Courts Electricity Transport Customs Telecoms AccessLand
1 MacroInstability 2.05
2 GovPolicyUnc ** 1.45
3 Corruption ** ** 1.21
4 InadEducLabor ** ** 1.12
5 LaborReg ** ** ** 1.07
6 TaxAdministration ** ** ** 1.04
7  CrimeTheftDisorder ** ** ** ** 0.97
8  BusLicensing ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.80
9  Courts ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.77
10  Electricity ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.71
11  Transport ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.54
12  Customs ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.45
13  Telecoms ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.42
14  AccessLand ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** * 0.41
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Table A6a
Ranking constraints: Low income formerly planned economies (2008) and market economies.
Planned; Low-income 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
PoliticalIn Electricity Corruption InadEducL CrimeThef TaxAdmin Courts AccessLand Transport BusLicens Customs LaborReg
1 Political Instability 2.04
2 Electricity 1.98
3 Corruption 1.94
4 InadEducLabor ** 1.81
5 CrimeTheftDisorder ** ** ** 1.65
6 TaxAdministration ** ** ** ** * 1.44
7  Courts ** ** ** ** ** 1.34
8  AccessLand ** ** ** ** ** 1.25
9  Transport ** ** ** ** ** ** 1.16
10  BusLicensing ** ** ** ** ** ** * 1.14
11  Customs ** ** ** ** ** ** ** * 1.03
12  LaborReg ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.75
Market; Low-income 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
PoliticalIn Electricity Corruption TaxAdmin CrimeThef InadEducL Transport LaborReg AccessLand BusLicens Courts Customs
1 PoliticalInstability 1.60
2 Electricity 1.57
3 Corruption 1.52
4 TaxAdministration ** ** ** 1.34
5 CrimeTheftDisorder ** ** ** ** 1.14
6 InadEducLabor ** ** ** ** 1.10
7  Transport ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.92
8  LaborReg ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.90
9  AccessLand ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.88
10  BusLicensing ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.88
11  Courts ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.80
12  Customs ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.74
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Table A6b
Ranking constraints: High income formerly planned economies (2008) and market economies.
Planned; High-income 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
PoliticalIn InadEducL Corruption Electricity TaxAdmin Courts CrimeThef BusLicensing AccessLand LaborReg Transport Customs
1 PoliticalInstability 1.72
2 InadEducLabor 1.67
3 Corruption 1.59
4 Electricity 1.55
5 TaxAdministration ** 1.53
6 Courts ** ** ** ** ** 1.27
7  CrimeTheftDisorder ** ** ** ** ** 1.16
8  BusLicensing ** ** ** ** ** * 1.11
9  AccessLand ** ** ** ** ** * 1.10
10  LaborReg ** ** ** ** ** ** 1.09
11  Transport ** ** ** ** ** ** 1.08
12  Customs ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.64
Market; High-income 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
PoliticalIn Corruption InadEducL LaborReg TaxAdmin CrimeThef BusLicensing Courts Electricity Transport Customs AccessLand
1 PoliticalInstability 1.85
2 Corruption ** 1.21
3 InadEducLabor ** 1.12
4 LaborReg ** ** 1.07
5 TaxAdministration ** ** 1.04
6 CrimeTheftDisorder ** ** ** 0.97
7  BusLicensing ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.80
8  Courts ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.77
9  Electricity ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.71
10  Transport ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.54
11  Customs ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0.45
12  AccessLand ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** * 0.41
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